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Ever since Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke made diversity in higher education
a constitutionally acceptable rationale for affirmative action programs,
the diversity rationale has received vehement criticism from across the
ideological spectrum. Critics on the right argue that diversity efforts lead
to “less meritorious” applicants being selected. Critics on the left charge
that diversity is mere “subterfuge.” On the diversity rationale’s
legitimacy, then, there is precious little diversity of thought. In particular,
prominent scholars and jurists have cast doubt on the diversity
rationale’s empirical foundations, claiming that it rests on an implausible and unsupported hypothesis.
To assess the diversity rationale, we conduct an empirical study of
student-run law reviews. Over the past several decades, many leading
law reviews have implemented diversity policies for selecting editors. We
investigate whether citations to articles that a law review publishes
change after it adopts a diversity policy. Using a dataset of nearly 13,000
articles published over a sixty-year period, we ﬁnd that law reviews that
adopt diversity policies see median citations to their volumes increase by
roughly 23% in the ensuing ﬁve years. In addition to exploring the effect
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of diversity policies on median citations, we also explore the effect of diversity policies on mean citations. When doing so, our estimates are consistently positive, but they are largely not statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels.
These ﬁndings have widespread implications. If diverse groups of
student editors perform better than nondiverse groups, it lends credibility
to the idea that diverse student bodies, faculties, and groups of employees
generally perform better. We thus view these results as empirically supporting the much-derided diversity rationale—support that could prove
critical as affirmative action confronts numerous threats.
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INTRODUCTION
Debate about the relative quality of various law review volumes is usually conﬁned to student editors’ offices. On rare occasions, such discussion
may spill over into the faculty lounge. But, in 2008, as then-Senator Barack
Obama began his bid for the White House, the comparative merits of legal
scholarship improbably became the subject of national news. Politico published an extensive article noting that Obama’s presidency of the Harvard
Law Review “has generated a . . . dust-up in the blogosphere.”1 In 1990,
Obama became the ﬁrst Black person elected to lead the Harvard Law
Review in its century-long history.2 That event generated a tremendous
amount of celebratory coverage at the time.3 But eighteen years later, some
observers suggested that Obama had presided over a notoriously weak volume of legal scholarship. One commenter on a legal blog counted the
total number of citations to Obama’s volume and to the adjacent volumes
and concluded that “Obama’s [Volume] 104 is the least-cited volume of
the Harvard Law Review in the last 20 years.”4 Another commenter went
further, stating that Obama “presided over a general ‘dumbing down’” of
the Review’s standards.5
Though it went unstated, the subtext of these remarks was clear: In
selecting a Black student as president of the Harvard Law Review, the editors who ran that journal had sacriﬁced quality at the altar of diversity. The
implication was that Obama’s volume garnered low citations not just by
random chance, or because his skills lay more with politics than with selecting law review articles, but because he had been awarded the position
in part due to his race. There was, of course, zero evidence that race aided
Obama’s membership on the law review or his ascension to its presidency.6
1. Jeffrey Ressner & Ben Smith, Obama Kept Law Review Balanced, Politico (June 23,
2008), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/06/obama-kept-law-review-balanced-011257
[https://perma.cc/G3XY-XSCM].
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Fox Butterﬁeld, First Black Elected to Head Harvard’s Law Review, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 6, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/06/us/first-black-elected-to-headharvard-s-law-review.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Tammerlin Drummond,
Barack Obama’s Law: Personality: Harvard Law Review’s First Black President Plans a Life
of Public Service. His Multicultural Background Gives Him Unique Perspective., L.A. Times
(Mar. 12, 1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-03-12-vw-74-story.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
4. Ressner & Smith, supra note 1 (quoting LawStatMan, Comment to Barack Obama
and the Harvard Law Review, Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 6, 2008), https://web.archive.org/
web/20080207110749/http://volokh.com/posts/1202117776.shtml (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review)).
5. Id. (quoting Ferry Pellwock, Comment to Barack Obama and the Harvard Law
Review, Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 5, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20080207110749/
http:/volokh.com/posts/1202117776.shtml (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)).
6. Here is Obama on the question in 2000:
I have no way of knowing whether I was a beneﬁciary of affirmative
action either in my admission to Harvard or my initial election to the
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But the idea that there might be a tradeoff between “merit” and diversity
was by then so well-ingrained into the public consciousness that the accusation had force even without evidence.7
A decade later, similar accusations resurfaced, this time in the form
of a lawsuit. In early October 2018, groups of students, faculty, and alumni
ﬁled lawsuits against the Harvard Law Review and the New York University
Law Review opposing practices that, they claimed, had “subordinated academic merit to diversity considerations.”8 The lawsuits claimed that the law
reviews’ policies to diversify their editorial boards have reduced the quality
of the articles that the law reviews published by ensuring that articles “are
judged by less capable students” and by “dilut[ing] the quality of the students who edit an author’s” work.9

Review . . . . If I was, then I certainly am not ashamed of the fact, for I
would argue that affirmative action is important precisely because those
who beneﬁt typically rise to the challenge when given an opportunity. Persons outside Harvard may have perceived my election to the presidency
of the Review as a consequence of affirmative action, since they did not
know me personally.
The First Black President of the Harvard Law Review, J. Blacks Higher Educ., Winter 2000–
2001, at 22, 24 [hereinafter JBHE, First Black President].
7. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 331 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“Blacks and Hispanics admitted to the University as a result of
racial discrimination are, on average, far less prepared than their white and Asian classmates.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 371–72 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The Law School is not looking for those students who, despite a
lower LSAT score or undergraduate grade point average, will succeed in the study of law.
The Law School seeks only a facade—it is sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does
not perform right.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 51–52, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02241) (statement of Scalia, J.) (“The people you want to talk to are the high school seniors
who have seen . . . people visibly less qualiﬁed than they are get into prestigious institutions
where they are rejected.”); Melvin I. Urofsky, The Affirmative Action Puzzle: A Living
History From Reconstruction to Today 467 (2020) (“Allowing less qualiﬁed people into
college or professional school or jobs demeans the institutions themselves. How much faith
can we have in the graduates of a medical school when we learn that its affirmative action
admits had considerably lower qualiﬁcations than the norm?”).
8. Complaint at 6, Fac., Alumni & Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. N.Y.
Univ. L. Rev., No. 1:18-cv-9184 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2018), 2018 WL 4899065 [hereinafter
Complaint Against NYULR]; Complaint at 6, Fac., Alumni & Students Opposed to Racial
Preferences v. Harvard L. Rev., No. 1:18-cv-12105 (D. Mass. Oct. 6, 2018), 2018 WL 5148474
[hereinafter Complaint Against HLR].
9. Complaint Against NYULR, supra note 8, at 6; Complaint Against HLR, supra note
8, at 6. The lawsuits also make other claims, including that the law reviews give “preference
to articles written by women and racial minorities.” Complaint Against NYULR, supra note
8, at 6; Complaint Against HLR, supra note 8, at 6. This Article focuses on policies aimed at
increasing the diversity of the law review editors because it is that policy that more directly
implicates the broader issue of diversity in higher education. For further discussion of the
lawsuits, see Bob Van Voris, Harvard Law Review Suit Opens New Front in Admissions-Bias
Fight, Bloomberg (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-08/
harvard-law-review-suit-opens-new-front-in-admissions-bias-ﬁght (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
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These allegations implicate longstanding criticisms of diversity initiatives. Ever since Justice Lewis Powell’s 1978 opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke made diversity in higher education a constitutionally acceptable rationale for affirmative action programs,10 critics of
affirmative action have pitted diversity against ideals of merit. They have
argued that efforts to attain diversity will necessarily lead to lower quality
results, as “less meritorious” individuals are selected in place of people
with ostensibly stronger qualiﬁcations.11
Moreover, scholars and jurists who are critical of affirmative action
have frequently cast doubt on the diversity rationale’s empirical foundations. In 2014, Professor Peter H. Schuck of Yale Law School contended:
“[T]he premises underlying the diversity rationale for race-based affirmative action are empirically tenuous and theoretically implausible.”12 That
same year, scholar Abigail Thernstrom similarly asserted that “the entire
ediﬁce of [affirmative action] is built on a purely speculative promise that
‘diversity’ will bring educational beneﬁts.”13 Two years later, noted economist Thomas Sowell voiced a particularly acerbic version of this skepticism:
“Nothing so epitomizes the politically correct gullibility of our times as the
magic word ‘diversity.’ The wonders of diversity are proclaimed from the
media . . . and conﬁrmed in the august chambers of the Supreme Court of
the United States. But have you ever seen one speck of hard evidence to
support the lofty claims?”14
Such skepticism has made its way to the august chambers of the
Supreme Court as well. In 2016, Justice Samuel Alito dissented in an opinion upholding affirmative action at the University of Texas at Austin. In
doing so, Justice Alito expressed frustration that those “invoking ‘the educational beneﬁts of diversity’” had “not identif[ied] any metric that would
allow a court to” assess whether the purported beneﬁts were being realized.15 Even some supporters of affirmative action have doubted the quality of empirical evidence that has been marshaled to support the diversity
rationale. For example, Professor Randall Kennedy of Harvard Law School
wrote a book defending affirmative action, titled For Discrimination, in
which he confessed: “I remain doubtful about social scientiﬁc ‘proof’ of
diversity’s values; much of that [research] seems exaggerated and predetermined with litigation in mind.”16
10. 438 U.S. 265, 311–15 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
11. See infra section I.B.
12. Peter H. Schuck, Assessing Affirmative Action, 20 Nat’l Affs. 76, 76 (2014).
13. Abigail Thernstrom, Questioning the Rationale for Affirmative Action, 16 Virtual
Mentor 495, 495 (2014).
14. Thomas Sowell, The ‘Diversity’ Fraud, Creators (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.
creators.com/read/thomas-sowell/12/16/the-diversity-fraud [https://perma.cc/38N8-FXXT].
15. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
16. Randall Kennedy, For Discrimination: Race, Affirmative Action, and the Law 103
(2013) [hereinafter Kennedy, For Discrimination].
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Professor Kennedy is correct that the existing empirical literature on
diversity in higher education is lacking. A major reason is the difficulty of
measuring and evaluating performance in a manner that would shed light
on the value of diversity in higher education. How can one measure the
output of a university (or a law school)? Suppose a law school is able to
attract a particularly diverse class for a given year. How would we be able
to tell if the class’s diversity improved the students’ educational experience? Given that students are graded on a curve relative to each other,
assessing whether having a more diverse class improves outcomes is not a
straightforward task. Accordingly, the empirical evidence on the effects of
diversity has remained lacking, and the debate has raged on.17
It is difficult to exaggerate the stakes of this debate. In January 2022,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear lawsuits challenging the affirmative action admissions policies at Harvard University and the University of North
Carolina.18 In Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 2003 majority opinion in
Grutter v. Bollinger upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s afﬁrmative action policy, she suggested that affirmative action would no
longer be necessary in 2028.19 The Court now could very well be poised to
eliminate the practice ﬁve years ahead of that schedule.20 This dispute implicates private institutions as much as it does public ones: The Court held
in Bakke that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racial discrimination by any private institution that accepts federal funding, is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.21 If
diversity provides no beneﬁts, then, under current doctrine, it cannot
serve as a compelling governmental interest. If it cannot serve as a compelling governmental interest, then affirmative action programs throughout higher education rest on an inﬁrm foundation and may soon fall.
This Article aims to offer empirical evidence of the effects of diversity
in higher education. Indeed, we believe that the lawsuits against the
17. For a survey of the existing literature, see infra section I.C.
18. See Adam Liptak & Anemona Hartocollis, Supreme Court Will Hear Challenge to
Affirmative Action at Harvard and U.N.C., N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/01/24/us/politics/supreme-court-affirmative-action-harvard-unc.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
19. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). The
Supreme Court in Grutter upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action
policy because it was narrowly tailored to achieve Michigan’s compelling interest in achieving a diverse class. See id. at 334. By contrast, in the companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger, the
Court invalidated the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program because
it reasoned that the program too closely resembled an impermissible quota. See 539 U.S.
244, 271–72 (2003).
20. See Liptak & Hartocollis, supra note 18.
21. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (“In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those
racial classiﬁcations that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
Amendment.”); id. at 352–53 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (“Title VI’s deﬁnition of
racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution’s . . . .”).
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Harvard Law Review and New York University Law Review offer an ideal
setting in which to study the inﬂuence of diversity policies on group performance in higher education. The work of law review editors involves core
higher-education functions: Students work together in a group to evaluate
the merits of scholarly work, selecting a few articles to publish from thousands of submissions.22 The editors then edit the substance and style of
those articles before publishing them.23 The articles that student-run law
reviews publish have the advantage of presenting a publicly observable outcome: article impact, as measured by citations.24 And although diversity
policies for selecting editors may only result in a few additional diverse law
students selected as editors, research suggests that even minimal increases
in diversity can radically change group decisionmaking.25
We speciﬁcally investigate whether the citations to articles that a given
law review publishes change after the adoption of a diversity policy for selecting editors.26 To do so, we documented the adoption of diversity policies by the ﬂagship law reviews for the top twenty law schools since 1960.
We compiled a dataset of the citations to the nearly 13,000 articles published by leading law reviews during this period. In our preferred speciﬁcation, we assess changes in the citations of articles published from the ﬁve
years before a change in a journal’s diversity policy relative to the ﬁve years
afterward.27 We ﬁnd that law review membership diversity policies increase
median article citations by roughly 25%. In addition to exploring the effect
of diversity policies on median citations, we also explore the effect of diversity policies on mean citations. When doing so, our estimates are consistently positive, but they are largely not statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels.
22. See, e.g., Yale L.J., When to Submit Articles and Essays 2, https://www.
yalelawjournal.org/ﬁles/WhenToSubmit_4xqshn68.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9U4-HBK6]
(last visited Sept. 28, 2021).
23. See Anne Enquist, Substantive Editing Versus Technical Editing: How Law Review
Editors Do Their Job, 30 Stetson L. Rev. 451, 452 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Most Cited Journals and Journal Articles in HeinOnline—Updated!,
HeinOnline Blog (May 4, 2009), http://heinonline.blogspot.com/2009/04/most-citedjournals-and-journal.html [https://perma.cc/X2RL-Z84D].
25. For other examples of increases in group diversity changing group behavior, see,
e.g., Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. Fin. Econ. 291, 293 (2009) (ﬁnding that “gender-diverse
boards are tougher monitors”); Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, A Jury
of Her Peers: The Impact of the First Female Jurors on Criminal Convictions, 129 Econ. J.
603, 607 (2019) [hereinafter Anwar et al., A Jury of Her Peers] (ﬁnding that “female representation on juries signiﬁcantly increased conviction rates for sex offence cases”).
26. These policies have been referred to in numerous ways, including affirmative action policies, racial and gender preferences, and diversity policies. We use the term “affirmative action” in the title because we believe it is more widely understood, but we also use the
term “diversity policies” throughout this Article in part because we believe it is less politically
charged.
27. We performed a robustness check in which we used different windows of time and
ﬁnd consistent results. See infra Part III.
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Notably, we ﬁnd that this increase does not appear to be driven by a
change in the share of articles a journal publishes on different subjects.
One could imagine a diversity policy resulting in a journal publishing
more articles on (for instance) constitutional law and fewer on tax law.
Because citations systematically vary between subjects—for instance, constitutional law articles are cited more than tax law articles28—the increase
in citations to journals that adopted diversity policies could be driven by
changes in the subjects of the articles being published. Nevertheless, we
ﬁnd no evidence that journals systematically changed the mix of subjects
among the articles they accepted.
These ﬁndings have implications beyond the law review setting. If diverse groups of student editors perform better than nondiverse groups, it
lends credibility to the idea that diverse student bodies, diverse student
organizations, diverse faculties, diverse teams of attorneys, and diverse
teams of employees generally could perform better than nondiverse
teams. We thus view these results as placing empirical heft behind Justice
Powell’s much-derided rationale from Bakke. To the extent that the results
are generalizable, courts should continue to view diversity as a compelling
governmental interest when adjudicating affirmative action cases under
the Equal Protection Clause or under Title VI.
Before continuing, it is important to acknowledge that citations are
not a perfect measure of an article’s impact, much less a perfect measure
of its quality. In some instances, excellent work is no doubt lowly cited and
execrable work is highly cited. Nevertheless, citations are a widely used
measure of research impact across different disciplines29 and a reasonable
proxy for academic impact, as they indicate the extent to which an article

28. See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law
Reviews, 29 J. Legal Stud. 427, 431 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Dennis M. Gerrity & Richard B. McKenzie, The Ranking of Southern
Economics Departments: New Criterion and Further Evidence, 45 S. Econ. J. 608, 611–13
(1978) (using citations to rank economics departments); Daniel S. Hamermesh, Citations
in Economics: Measurement, Uses, and Impacts, 56 J. Econ. Literature 115, 125–42 (2018)
(using citations to evaluate economics articles, subﬁelds, journals, professors, and departments); John Mingers & Fang Xu, The Drivers of Citations in Management Science Journals,
205 Eur. J. Operational Rsch. 422, 422 (2010) (“Measuring the scientiﬁc impact of researchers’ work is a difficult but important issue . . . . Particular attention has been paid to the
number of citations that a publication receives.”); Gregory Sisk, Valerie Aggerbeck, Nick
Farris, Megan McNevin & Maria Pitner, Scholarly Impact of Law School Faculties in 2015:
Updating the Leiter Score Ranking for the Top Third, 12 Univ. St. Thomas L.J. 100, 100
(2015) (“[T]he ‘Scholarly Impact Score’ for a law faculty is calculated from the mean and
the median of total law journal citations over the past ﬁve years to the work of tenured members of that law faculty.”); Iman Tahamtan, Askar Saﬁpour Afshar & Khadijeh Ahamdzadeh,
Factors Affecting Number of Citations: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 107
Scientometrics 1195, 1196 (2016) (“When a particular paper is cited more frequently than
others, it is usually concluded that it has a higher quality compared to other papers.” (citation omitted)). We further discuss the limitations and shortcomings of citations as a measure
of output. See infra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.
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has shaped the scholarly conversation.30 In addition, citation counts are
particularly pertinent because law review editors themselves consider how
likely a piece may be cited when deciding whether to publish it.31 Thus,
the measure used here is one that law review editors themselves prioritize.
It is advantageous to assess the performance of law review boards according to a metric they value themselves. We also have it on good authority
that citations are important to law professors, who endeavor to place their
articles in publications with high visibility in order to maximize their citations.32
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches the legal history of the
diversity rationale for affirmative action programs in the United States,
which predates Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. It then lays out the many
criticisms of Powell’s opinion that writers and thinkers across the political
spectrum have lodged. In addition, Part I surveys the existing empirical
literature on diversity. Part II describes the data collected for this study.
Part III explains the research design used to assess the relationship between the adoption of diversity policies and article citations. Part IV presents the primary results, as well as a variety of checks on the robustness of
those results. Part V connects the results to the broader debate over diversity and affirmative action. We argue that the law should provide even
more space for institutions to pursue policies that will add to their diversity
while simultaneously improving their work and results.

30. See, e.g., Gerrity & McKenzie, supra note 29, at 610 (“[T]he total number of citations a person or department has accumulated over a period of time is . . . a reasonably good
proxy measure of the productivity of individual economists or departments.”); Mark J.
McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, Does Online Availability Increase Citations? Theory and
Evidence From a Panel of Economics and Business Journals, 97 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 144, 144
(2015) (“Understanding the market for academic journals is important to scholars because
it is the one market in which they function as both producers and consumers. Citations are
the currency in this market . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
31. See Jason P. Nance & Dylan J. Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process:
Results From a National Study, 71 Alb. L. Rev. 565, 585 (2008) (“Editors have an incentive
to publish not the ‘best’ scholarship, but that which will be most widely read and cited.”).
32. See James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Proliﬁc Law Professors and
Faculties, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 781, 783 (1996) (noting before unveiling a list of the most
cited law reviews that “many law professors will use the lists of law reviews to help them
determine which law reviews to submit articles to”); Joe Palazzolo, The Most-Cited Law
Review Articles of All Time, Wall St. J. (June 1, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB42728 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The law professor equivalent of career hits
is the ‘number of times cited’ in journals.”); Paul Caron, How to Juice Your Citations in the
HeinOnline/U.S. News Rankings, TaxProf Blog (Mar. 29, 2021), https://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof_blog/2021/03/how-to-juice-your-citations-in-the-heinonlineus-news-rankings.
html [https://perma.cc/P63S-N3D6] (recommending that authors aim to publish in top
journals in order to “juice” their citations). Unsurprisingly, this phenomenon is not conﬁned to legal academia. See Tahamtan et al., supra note 29, at 1196 (“Researchers publish
their ﬁndings so that they can attract the greatest attention and have the highest impact on
the scientiﬁc community. They often try to publish their papers in high-impact journals to
reach more readers and to become more frequently cited.” (citation omitted)).
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I. THE LAW, THEORY, AND EMPIRICS OF THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE
A.

The Diversity Rationale in the Supreme Court

For more than forty years, diversity has been at the heart of the
Supreme Court’s evaluation of affirmative action in the context of higher
education. This Part sketches the development of that law across multiple
decades and opinions. The goal is not to offer an exhaustive history of this
topic, which is readily available elsewhere.33 Instead, this Part’s more modest aim is simply to establish the diversity rationale’s origins and its centrality to the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court elevated the diversity rationale beginning in the
late 1970s, and diversity has exerted considerable inﬂuence on American
law and American society more broadly ever since. As Professor Kennedy
has argued with some force: “In the marketplace of political culture, few
terms have amassed more inﬂuence as quickly as ‘diversity.’ Were it tradable as stock, its price would have soared over the past . . . decades.”34 To be
sure, the diversity rationale has garnered many high-proﬁle, vehement detractors among scholars, pundits, and jurists, as the following section explores in considerable depth. But it is more than likely that the Supreme
Court’s elevation of the diversity rationale has played no small role in motivating many universities, law schools, and even law reviews—not to mention private businesses—to enact their own policies promoting racial
diversity.
Although the Supreme Court’s involvement with affirmative action is
often understood to have begun in 1978 with its decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, the Court actually heard oral argument in
an affirmative action case a few years earlier—DeFunis v. Odegaard.35 It is
important to recall that commonly overlooked case because it contains the
origins of the Court’s ultimate invocation of the diversity rationale.36 In
1974, the Supreme Court entertained a challenge by Marco DeFunis, Jr.,

33. For two recent historical and analytical treatments of affirmative action, see generally Kennedy, For Discrimination, supra note 16; Urofsky, supra note 7. It is impossible to
overstate the contributions of these two excellent volumes for both this Part and Part V.
These Parts draw on their incisive analyses throughout.
34. Kennedy, For Discrimination, supra note 16, at 100.
35. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
36. For the invaluable intellectual work that recovers this forgotten history, see David
B. Oppenheimer, Archibald Cox and the Diversity Justiﬁcation for Affirmative Action, 25
Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 158, 162–64 (2018); Anthony S. Chen & Lisa M. Stulberg, Before Bakke:
The Hidden History of the Diversity Rationale, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/10/30/aa-chen-stulberg/ [https://perma.cc/BC8LM9UF].
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to the University of Washington School of Law’s affirmative action program.37 The dispute attracted several amicus briefs,38 including a notable
one ﬁled by Archibald Cox, a Harvard Law School professor who served as
Solicitor General during the Kennedy Administration.39 Cox defended
race-conscious admissions policies in higher education by explaining in
considerable detail Harvard College’s diversity-based admissions
program.40
To formulate his brief, Cox worked closely with Harvard College’s admissions office to demonstrate how its vision and implementation of diversity had changed over the years.41 While Harvard College had long
pursued geographic diversity and diversity of intellectual and occupational
ambitions in composing its entering classes,42 it had in recent years broadened its conception of diversity to include racial diversity.43 As Cox vividly
encapsulated the point, “A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to
Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student
can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer . . . .”44 The
Court ultimately dismissed DeFunis as moot, effectively making the case
disappear.45 But the diversity rationale would become ever more visible
over time.
Four years later, when the Supreme Court agreed to resolve Allan
Bakke’s lawsuit against the U.C. Davis Medical School over its race-conscious admissions policy, the University of California retained Cox to defend the program.46 Cox declined to mention Harvard College’s
admissions policy in the brief that he ﬁled on California’s behalf.47 The
Harvard admissions policy did, however, receive sustained attention in an
amicus brief jointly ﬁled in Bakke by Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and the
University of Pennsylvania.48 That brief reproduced, almost verbatim,
37. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320–27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith Amicus Curiae,
DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312 (No. 73-235).
39. Brief of the President and Fellows of Harvard College Amicus Curiae, DeFunis, 416
U.S. 312 (No. 73-235).
40. See Oppenheimer, supra note 36, at 165–68.
41. See id. at 174–89.
42. See id. at 166–67.
43. See id.; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316–18 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.).
44. Oppenheimer, supra note 36, at 163.
45. While the University of Washington School of Law had initially rejected DeFunis,
it provisionally admitted him after the lawsuit commenced. Had the Supreme Court issued
a merits decision in the case, it would have done so very close to the time that DeFunis
graduated. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314–17 (1974).
46. Oppenheimer, supra note 36, at 197.
47. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811),
1977 WL 187977.
48. Brief of Columbia Univ., Harvard Univ., Stanford Univ. & the Univ. of Penn. as
Amici Curiae app. at *1, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 188007.
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Cox’s explanation of the diversity-driven Harvard admissions policy from
his DeFunis brief.49 In Bakke, Justice Powell was so enamored of this diversity justiﬁcation for affirmative action that his own opinion in the case
quoted extensively from the amicus brief’s description of the Harvard admissions policy, and he even included an appendix further excerpting that
description.50
Given the importance of this policy to Justice Powell’s thinking and
its continued relevance to the constitutionality of affirmative action today,
it is worth examining an extended excerpt from the Harvard amicus brief:
The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient to the
educational process has long been a tenet of Harvard College admissions. Fifteen or twenty years ago, however, diversity meant
students from California, New York, and Massachusetts; city
dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and football players;
biologists, historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians. . . . In recent years Harvard College has
expanded the concept of diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups. Harvard College
now recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks
and Chicanos and other minority students. Contemporary conditions in the United States mean that if Harvard College is to continue to offer a ﬁrst-rate education to its students, minority
representation in the undergraduate body cannot be ignored by
the Committee on Admissions.
In practice, this new deﬁnition of diversity has meant that
race has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the
Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of applicants who are “admissible” and deemed capable of doing good
work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance
in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may
tip the balance in other candidates’ cases. A farm boy from Idaho
can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot
offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that
a white person cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College depends in part on
these differences in the background and outlook that students
bring with them.51
Justice Powell’s view is of great moment in Bakke, of course, because
he cast the decisive vote to uphold the constitutionality of affirmative action in 1978. The Court in Bakke assessed the legality of U.C. Davis Medical

49. Oppenheimer, supra note 36, at 160–61, 164–65.
50. Id. at 161–62; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321–24 (1978) (appendix to opinion of
Powell, J.).
51. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322–23 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell quoted
an even longer excerpt from the amicus brief in his opinion; we have edited it here for
length.
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School’s admissions policy, which set aside sixteen slots for racial minorities out of one hundred total places in the entering class.52 The dispute
yielded a deeply divided Court. Four Justices voted to invalidate affirmative
action programs, including U.C. Davis’s program, under Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.53 Four other Justices rejected this statutory challenge
and further voted to uphold the constitutionality of affirmative action in
virtually all cases, including U.C. Davis’s.54 Justice Powell’s controlling vote
split the difference between these two poles. Powell voted to invalidate
U.C. Davis’s program, as he concluded that the policy failed to pass constitutional muster because it reserved a set number of seats for racial minorities, which were insulated from competition with the larger applicant
pool.55 But Justice Powell also refused to declare that universities could
never consider an applicant’s race without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.56
It was here that Justice Powell drew upon Harvard’s admissions policy.57 That policy was in no way a formal part of the Bakke lawsuit, but Powell
reached out to identify Harvard’s diversity-based admissions policy as the
sort of program that could survive Title VI and the Equal Protection
Clause.58 While Powell expressly rejected the notion that remediation of
racial harms could justify affirmative action,59 he also noted that “the attainment of a diverse student body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education.”60 Referencing ideas of academic
freedom associated with the First Amendment, Powell declared: “The atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation—so essential to the
quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”61 Powell further explained: “[T]he nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores

52. Id. at 278–79. U.C. Davis’s actual policy stated that the special admissions program
applied to “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds.” Id. at 272 n.1.
But the courts treated it as a policy for racial minorities. See id. at 319 (discussing the “Davis
special admissions program [as] involv[ing] the use of an explicit racial classiﬁcation”).
53. Id. at 408–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1964)).
54. Id. at 324–79 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 315–20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
56. Id. at 316–19.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 318 (“[Harvard’s admissions] program treats each applicant as an individual
in the admissions process. . . . His qualiﬁcations would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also id. at 287 (“Title VI must be held to proscribe only
those racial classiﬁcations that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
Amendment.”).
59. Id. at 310 (declining to recognize “societal discrimination” as a permissible basis
for affirmative action).
60. Id. at 311–12.
61. Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”62 Powell extolled
Harvard’s approach because it did not set aside a particular number of
slots for racial minorities from the entire applicant pool.63 Instead,
Harvard used individualized consideration of the applicants with an eye
toward creating a diverse entering class, racial and otherwise.64 “The ﬁle
of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive,” Powell explained.65 “[A]n admissions program operated in this way is ﬂexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualiﬁcations of each applicant, and to place them on the same
footing for consideration . . . .”66
Justice Powell’s veneration of the diversity rationale for upholding afﬁrmative action in Bakke was, at the time, highly idiosyncratic.67 He alone
on the Court extolled Harvard’s policy, and he alone rejected hard quotas
but embraced the softer goal of diversity.68 Powell thus controlled the outcome, but not one of his colleagues followed his lead.69 Yet that pattern
did not hold. The Supreme Court has with some frequency revisited afﬁrmative action in the years since it issued Bakke, and Powell’s once-unique
vision has repeatedly been affirmed as the governing law of the land.70 The
Court’s subsequent affirmative action opinions may accentuate this color
or dull that hue, but they are unmistakably working on the same diversity
canvas created by Powell.
In 2003, twenty-ﬁve years after Bakke, the Supreme Court reconsidered affirmative action in higher education in two cases involving the
University of Michigan. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court invalidated
the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program because
it too closely resembled the quota approach that had been outlawed in
Bakke.71 But in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court upheld the
University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program because it, in effect, had successfully replicated Harvard College’s policy, with its emphasis
on individualized consideration of applicants and the goal of enrolling a
racially diverse class.72
The core of Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Grutter was a
reaffirmation, and extension, of the diversity rationale pioneered by
Justice Powell. Portions of O’Connor’s opinion linked racial diversity to
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 313 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–56.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–66.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–56.
See infra text accompanying notes 71–92.
539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003).
539 U.S. 306, 334–35 (2003).
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geographic and other types of diversity. “Just as growing up in a particular
region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an
individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial
minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters,” O’Connor instructed.73 “The Law School has determined, based on
its experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational beneﬁts of a diverse student body.”74
O’Connor further noted that the Court deferred to Michigan’s view
that racial diversity formed a compelling governmental interest, as diversity “yield[s] educational beneﬁts” that “are not theoretical but real.”75
“[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning outcomes,” O’Connor contended, “and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”76 Diversity,
O’Connor stated, “promotes cross-racial understanding . . . [and]
break[s] down racial stereotypes, [and] [t]hese beneﬁts are important and
laudable, because classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening and interesting when the students have the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”77 Justice O’Connor noted that
amicus briefs ﬁled by several major corporations—including 3M and
General Motors—and retired military leaders had emphasized diversity’s
importance to fulﬁlling their basic missions.78 Finally, Justice O’Connor
extended Justice Powell’s logic by noting that racial diversity was particularly vital in law schools, which many of the nation’s future business and
political leaders attend.79 “In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualiﬁed individuals of every race and ethnicity,” O’Connor observed. “All members of our heterogeneous society
must have conﬁdence in the openness . . . of the educational institutions
that provide this training.”80
73. Id. at 333.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 328, 330.
76. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 340; see also Consolidated Brief of Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 10–30, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL
1787554 (contending that the state has a compelling interest in diverse officer corps); Brief
of Gen. Motors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5–18, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399096 (explaining that diversity in higher education is
necessary to equip students with the skillsets that companies require); Brief of 65 Leading
Am. Bus. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3–10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056 (arguing that diversity in higher education is essential to
prepare students to work in the modern, global economy).
79. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
80. Id. For additional commentary suggesting that Grutter’s conception of diversity was
more capacious than Powell’s opinion in Bakke, see Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for
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Most recently, the Supreme Court has entertained a pair of challenges
to the race-sensitive admissions policy enacted by the University of Texas
at Austin.81 Texas’s ﬂagship campus ﬁlls the majority of its entering class
through its “Top Ten Percent” program, which guarantees a spot to any
student in the state who graduates in the top decile of their public school’s
graduating class.82 Texas ﬁlled out the remainder of its class through its
“holistic” review process, part of which involves considering the race of
applicants.83 In 2013, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin (Fisher I) issued a narrow holding, ﬁnding that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit incorrectly deferred to Texas on the narrow
tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, and the Court remanded the
decision to the appellate court for further consideration.84 Writing for the
Court in Fisher I, Justice Anthony Kennedy acknowledged the continuing
resonance of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke extolling diversity. As Justice
Kennedy conveyed this idea, “The attainment of a diverse student body . . .
enhance[s] classroom dialogue and . . . lessen[s] . . . racial isolation and
stereotypes.”85 But Justice Kennedy also sounded a note of caution:
“Justice Powell’s central point . . . was that this interest in securing
diversity’s beneﬁts, although a permissible objective, is complex.”86
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit again determined that Texas’s admissions policy did not violate the Constitution.87
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and, with a 4–3 decision written by Justice Kennedy in 2016, agreed that the policy was constitutional
in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II).88 The University of Texas,
in its internal policies, had long justiﬁed its admissions program by invoking language and concepts from the Supreme Court’s prior affirmative action decisions. Thus, Texas sought “an academic environment that offers
a robust exchange of ideas” and also the “promot[ion] [of] cross-racial
Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 Tul. L.
Rev. 1767, 1772–74 (2004).
81. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
82. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205–06.
83. Id. at 2206–07.
84. 570 U.S. at 314–15.
85. Id. at 308.
86. Id.
87. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 659–60 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S.
Ct. 2198 (2016).
88. 136 S. Ct. at 2205–07. The unusually small number of Justices in Fisher II can readily
be explained. Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from the case, presumably because she
worked on the case during her time as Solicitor General. See Olivia Fitzpatrick, When Do
Supreme Court Justices Recuse Themselves From Cases?, Const. Daily (May 21, 2016),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/when-do-supreme-court-justices-recuse-themselves-fromcases [https://perma.cc/C3BG-73YL]. Justice Scalia died after oral argument but before
the case had been decided. See Ross Ramsey, Julián Aguilar, Jordan Rudner, Matthew
Watkins & Alexa Ura, Scalia’s Death Impacts Texas Cases at U.S. Supreme Court, Tex. Trib.
(Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/02/13/texas-conservatives-lose-reliablefriend-high-cour [https://perma.cc/SE95-ZJRB].
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understanding, the preparation of a student body for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and the cultivat[ion] [of] a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”89 Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted
and did not dispute the diversity rationales previously articulated in Bakke
and Grutter. At times, however, Kennedy also struck a tone that seemed less
enamored of diversity than Justice O’Connor was in Grutter. “Considerable
deference is owed to a university in deﬁning those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational mission,” Kennedy wrote.90 “But still, it remains an enduring
challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity.”91
Kennedy closed his opinion for the Court by noting that it was incumbent
upon universities to reevaluate continually whether their usage of racial
classiﬁcations in admissions remained necessary.92
Two interrelated aspects of this capsule history merit brief elaboration. First, it is striking how affirmative action has repeatedly been preserved by a highly improbable series of Republican-appointed, largely
conservative Justices. Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher II were all decided by a single vote, and that controlling vote was cast by someone who would have
reasonably been thought not to love affirmative action but to loathe it.93
Before Bakke, Justice Powell led the Richmond School Board during the
1950s and 1960s in its efforts to resist Brown v. Board of Education.94 The
path from ﬁghting desegregation in the Jim Crow South to promoting racial diversity in the nation’s universities has seldom been traveled, but
Powell made that unlikely journey.95 Before Grutter, Justice O’Connor had
condemned efforts to promote racial inclusion in Congress as violating the
Equal Protection Clause.96 Nonetheless, ten years later, Justice O’Connor
stirringly attested to the importance of having racially diverse law schools
in order to have a racially diverse group of political leaders.97 Before Fisher
II, Justice Kennedy voted both to reject the affirmative action program
contested in Grutter and even to invalidate democratically enacted efforts

89. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 2214.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2214–15.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99.
94. 348 U.S. 886 (1954).
95. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography 469–73 (1994); see
also Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the
Battle for the American Mind 276 (2018) (“As chairman of the Richmond School Board
when the Court issued Brown, Powell oversaw a system that for six full years after the decision
saw not a single black student attend school with white students.”).
96. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641–58 (1993); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–37 (1995) (requiring strict scrutiny for all affirmative action programs, per an opinion by Justice O’Connor).
97. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–33 (2003).
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to promote racially integrated elementary and secondary schools.98 Yet,
when presented with an opportunity to eliminate affirmative action less
than a decade later, Justice Kennedy declined to do so.99 This pattern may
be tested again soon. Challenges to the Harvard100 and University of North
Carolina101 admissions programs have now made their way to the Supreme
Court.102 In 2022, the Court will yet again contemplate the fate of affirmative action in America. And the Court’s membership has only become
more conservative since Fisher II, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett replacing
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Brett Kavanaugh replacing Justice
Anthony Kennedy, and Justice Neil Gorsuch assuming the seat that was
empty in Fisher II.103
Second, perhaps informed by these pivotal Justices’ checkered histories on race, the major decisions in this area can all be viewed as validating
affirmative action in a manner that is more half-hearted than full-throated.
In 1978, Bakke invalidated the U.C. Davis program under review but upheld the prospect of affirmative action.104 In 2003, the Court invalidated
the Michigan undergraduate admissions plan in Gratz but upheld the
Michigan Law School plan in Grutter—actions that Justice Scalia dubbed
“today’s Grutter–Gratz split double header.”105 In 2016, Fisher II upheld
Texas’s admissions plan but did so in a somewhat grudging manner, emphasizing that states must continually check that they are not using race in
admissions gratuitously.106
These two dynamics may help to explain some of the vitriol that has
been directed at the diversity rationale for affirmative action over the
years. From the left, it might seem that a rationale capable of garnering
the votes of Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy is insufficiently robust
98. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782–98
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 387–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For an analysis of Parents Involved, including of Justice
Kennedy’s controlling opinion, see generally Driver, supra note 95, at 293–308.
99. For an illuminating article that may help to explain why Justice O’Connor and
Justice Kennedy surprisingly voted to preserve affirmative action, see David A. Strauss, Fisher
v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case for Affirmative Action, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
100. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 F.3d 157,
182–204 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that the Harvard admissions program does not violate Title
VI).
101. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 1:14CV954, 2019 WL
4773908, at *6–11 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2019) (denying parties’ motions for summary judgment and setting the stage for trial).
102. See Liptak & Hartocollis, supra note 18.
103. See Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court Hasn’t Been This Conservative Since the
1930s, CNN (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/26/politics/supreme-courtconservative/index.html [https://perma.cc/83FC-MQL2].
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–320 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
105. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
106. 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214–15 (2016).
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in its conceptualization of racial justice.107 From the right, it might seem
that the allegedly wishy-washy diversity rationale—barely esteemed even by
its expositors—has failed to provide clear rules to universities about what
is permissible.108 The diversity rationale’s nebulous nature, critics from the
right maintain, provides additional fodder for criticizing what they deem
the deeply objectionable consideration of race.109 The next section explores these criticisms in greater detail.
B.

Diversity’s Discontents

Bakke has now existed as governing law for more than four decades.
The decision’s durability has not, however, insulated it from criticism. To
the contrary, Bakke in general and Justice Powell’s diversity rationale in
particular have generated a ﬁrestorm of condemnation. In addition to its
volume, perhaps the most notable aspect of this criticism is that it has
emerged from across the ideological spectrum. From both the right and
the left, from both opponents and proponents of affirmative action,
Powell’s diversity rationale—and the Court’s subsequent iterations—have
over the years encountered many foes and desperately few friends. Surveying this opposition to the diversity rationale—which has been voiced in
newspapers, opinion journals, law reviews, and, of course, judicial
opinions—is essential because this Article’s ﬁndings lend that muchbeleaguered concept a meaningful measure of support.110
Upon Bakke’s release, the diversity rationale—and the compromise it
engendered—enjoyed no honeymoon period but instead met immediate,
vehement disapproval from some of the nation’s foremost legal scholars.111
Then-Professor Robert Bork of Yale Law School set the early terms of debate in the Wall Street Journal. Writing less than a decade before he was
nominated to the Supreme Court, Bork mocked Powell’s opinion as interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to “allow[] some, but not too much,
reverse discrimination.”112 “[T]he solution may seem statesmanlike,” Bork
107. See infra text accompanying notes 116–117.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 111–115.
109. Justice Scalia emphasized this point about the diversity rationale’s vagueness in
Grutter. “Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational
institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are OK,” Justice Scalia maintained, “[the diversity
standard] seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation.” 539 U.S.
at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Professor Kennedy offered a particularly crisp, lucid articulation of the diversity
rationale’s critics from across the ideological spectrum. See Kennedy, For Discrimination,
supra note 16, at 100–06. Our analysis here is deeply indebted to his categories and examples throughout.
111. Then-Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote, “Powell was . . . criticized by both
sides for doing nothing more than chasing ‘reverse racism’ underground.” J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1945–
1978, at 304 (1979) [hereinafter Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke].
112. Robert H. Bork, The Unpersuasive Bakke Decision, Wall St. J., July 21, 1978, at 8.
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allowed, “but as constitutional argument, it leaves you hungry an hour
later.”113 Antonin Scalia—who was then a professor at the University of
Chicago Law School and would later ascend to the Supreme Court in
1986—derided the diversity rationale in similar terms. “Justice Powell’s
opinion . . . strikes me as an excellent compromise between two committees of the American Bar Association on some insigniﬁcant legislative proposal,” Scalia charged.114 “But it is thoroughly unconvincing as an honest,
hardminded, reasoned analysis of an important provision of the
Constitution.”115
Such conservative criticism may not be especially surprising. Yet leftleaning critics also quickly denounced Powell’s compromise in Bakke.
Professor Ronald Dworkin, writing in the New York Review of Books, labeled
Powell’s opinion “weak” and observed: “It does not supply a sound intellectual foundation for [Powell’s] compromise . . . . The compromise is appealing politically, but it does not follow that it reﬂects any important
difference in principle . . . .”116 In a similar vein, Professor Guido Calabresi
published a New York Times op-ed lamenting the “lost candor” and “subterfuge” enabled by Justice Powell’s “Solomonic vote” that embraced goals
but eschewed quotas.117
Critics on both the left and the right have condemned the diversity
rationale for inviting university administrators to obsess over racial appearances and to treat racial minorities as mere window dressing, whose presence beneﬁts white students. Six years after Bakke, Professor Richard
Delgado, an early proponent of Critical Race Theory, regretted how the
diversity rationale “may well be perceived as treating the minority . . . as an
ornament, a curiosity, one who brings an element of the piquant to the
113. Id.
114. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must
First Take Account of Race.”, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 148 (1979).
115. Id. Then-Professor Scalia further employed this sarcastic writing style to mock
Powell’s emphasis on diversity:
[W]e will expose these impressionable youngsters to a great diversity of people.
We want them to work and play with pianists, maybe ﬂute players. We want people
from the country, from the city. We want bespectacled chess champions and football players. And, oh yes, we may want some racial minorities, too.
Id. at 147–48; see also id. at 148 (“When it comes to choosing among these manifold diversities in God’s creation, will being a piano player, do you suppose, be regarded as more
important than having yellow skin?”). Scalia later used this ridiculing style in numerous
opinions as a Supreme Court Justice. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This is not, of course, an ‘educational
beneﬁt’ on which students will be graded on their law school transcript (Works and Plays
Well with Others: B+) or tested by the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your
cross-racial understanding).”).
116. Robert Dworkin, The Bakke Decision: Did It Decide Anything?, N.Y. Rev. of Books,
Aug. 19, 1978, at 22.
117. Guido Calabresi, Bakke: Lost Candor, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1978, at A19 (critiquing
the diversity rationale); see also Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 427, 431–32 (1979) (same).
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lives of white professors and students.”118 Professor Nancy Leong recently
voiced a similar critique in the Harvard Law Review : “[O]ur legal and social
emphasis on diversity . . . has . . . in many cases contributed to a state of
affairs that degrades nonwhiteness by commodifying it and . . . relegates
nonwhite individuals to the status of ‘trophies’ or ‘passive emblems.’”119
These warnings have been echoed by conservatives as well. As Fisher I made
its way to the Supreme Court, columnist George Will inveighed against the
harms of racial artiﬁce. “[D]iversity bureaucracies on campuses will continue to use minority students as mere means to other people’s ends,” Will
asserted, “injuring minorities by treating them as ingredients that supposedly enrich the academic experience of others.”120 Relatedly, Shelby
Steele, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, has criticized the diversity
rationale as “an unexamined kitsch that whites (especially administrators
and executives) use to dignify their use of racial preferences as they . . .
engineer . . . a look of racial parity.”121
Many scholars, on both the left and the right, have ampliﬁed
Professor Calabresi’s fears concerning lost candor. They have criticized the
diversity rationale’s effort to distinguish goals from quotas because they
believe that the distinction requires decisionmakers to dissemble—or
perhaps even to outright lie. Professor Sanford Levinson, a supporter of
affirmative action, lambasted Powell’s opinion for creating “the
disingenuous reliance on the language of ‘diversity.’”122 Professor John
McWhorter, in an article titled The Campus Diversity Fraud published by the
conservative Manhattan Institute, contended that the diversity rationale
“has been, from the start, an argument shot through with duplicity and
bad faith,” and called it “a craven, disingenuous, and destructive
canard.”123 Professor Lino Graglia, an ardent opponent of affirmative
action, has also deemed the diversity rationale simply a “fraud.”124 In
118. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reﬂections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561, 570 n.46 (1984).
119. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2151, 2156 (2013); see also id. at
2155 (“This superﬁcial view of diversity consequently leads white individuals and predominantly white institutions to treat nonwhiteness as a prized commodity rather than as a cherished and personal manifestation of identity.”). For a related argument, see Osamudia R.
James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity
Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 425, 450–53 (2014), which overviews critiques that the ultimate
beneﬁciaries of diversity initiatives are white institutions, not minority students.
120. George F. Will, Opinion, The Unintended Consequences of Racial Preferences,
Wash. Post (Nov. 30, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-unintendedconsequences-of-racial-preferences/2011/11/29/gIQAbuoPEO_story.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
121. Kennedy, For Discrimination, supra note 16, at 101 (quoting an email from Shelby
Steele).
122. Sanford Levinson, Wrestling With Diversity 55–56 (2003).
123. John H. McWhorter, The Campus Diversity Fraud, City J. (2002), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/campus-diversity-fraud-12218.html [https://perma.cc/V2HL-86RR].
124. Lino A. Graglia, The “Affirmative Action” Fraud, 54 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp.
L. 31, 31–34 (1998) [hereinafter Graglia, The “Affirmative Action” Fraud].
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Grutter’s wake, Professor Brian Fitzpatrick went further, contending that
the University of Michigan Law School “lied to the Supreme Court when
it claimed it [uses affirmative action] to obtain the educational beneﬁts of
diversity, and well near every other elite university lies when they say the
same thing.”125 In 2016, Thomas Sowell condemned the “slippery”
concept of diversity and blamed Justice Powell’s opinion for telling leaders
of higher education “in effect that they can have racial quotas, but they
just can’t call them racial quotas.”126
Several prominent scholars have extended this disingenuousness critique by observing that higher education typically employs an anemic conception of diversity compared to the one Justice Powell defended in Bakke.
Professor Jed Rubenfeld, writing in the Yale Law Journal, pressed this point
memorably in 1997, one year after the Fifth Circuit struck down the
University of Texas’s affirmative action plan in Hopwood v. Texas.127 “Everyone knows that in most cases a true diversity of perspectives and backgrounds is not really being pursued,” Rubenfeld wrote.128 “(Why no
preferences for fundamentalist Christians or for neo-Nazis?)”129 Six years
later, Professor Samuel Issacharoff advanced an almost identical claim
while the Court considered Grutter and Gratz. “The commitment to diversity is not real,” Issacharoff informed the Wall Street Journal.130 “None of
these universities has an affirmative-action program for Christian fundamentalists, Muslims, orthodox Jews, or any other group that has a distinct
viewpoint. How many schools reach out for neo-Nazis?”131 Although
Rubenfeld and Issacharoff support affirmative action, opponents have also
suggested that higher education is not actually interested in diverse viewpoints. Professor Graglia has stated: “If diversity of views or experience
were the objective, one would expect to see a preference for foreign students or members of minority religions, which is not the case.”132 In 2002,
Professor McWhorter endorsed this same critique. “Mormons, paraplegics, people from Alaska, lesbians, Ayn Randians, and poor whites exert
125. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 385, 386 (2003);
see also Lino A. Graglia, Fraud by the Supreme Court: Racial Discrimination by a State
Institution of Higher Education Upheld on “Diversity” Grounds, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 57, 65–
68 (2004) (referring to the Harvard College admissions policy that Powell extolled as a
model in Bakke as “a compendium of lies and hypocrisies” and referring to “[t]he fundamental and overarching falsehood of Grutter”).
126. Sowell, supra note 14.
127. 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
128. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 471 (1997).
129. Id.
130. Daniel Golden, Some Backers of Racial Preference Take Diversity Rationale
Further, Wall St. J. (June 13, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105545471212086900
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
131. Id. Professor Kennedy also linked the diversity critiques lodged by Professors
Rubenfeld and Issacharoff. See Kennedy, For Discrimination, supra note 16, at 103.
132. Graglia, The “Affirmative Action” Fraud, supra note 124, at 34.
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little pull on the heartstrings of admissions committees so committed to
making campuses ‘look like America,’” McWhorter noted.133 “The
diversity that counts is brown-skinned minorities, especially African
Americans.”134
Supporters of affirmative action have repeatedly expressed concern
that diversity is a weaker justiﬁcation for racial policies of inclusion than
remediation for America’s racist past and present would be. After Grutter,
Professor Orlando Patterson asserted that “[u]sing diversity as a rationale
for affirmative action . . . distorts [its] aims” and noted that the diversity
rationale was weaker compared to “[t]he original, morally incontestable
goal of . . . the integration of African-Americans into all important areas . . . from which they had been historically excluded.”135 Colin Diver—
then-President of Reed College and a former law school professor—espoused this same reasoning: “We would be better off by giving up the diversity rationalization and forthrightly adopting a suitably constrained
remedial justiﬁcation.”136 In 2013, on Grutter’s tenth anniversary, Professor
Kennedy similarly contended, “[T]he obligation to right past wrongs, the
imperative to facilitate integration and the duty to counter ongoing but
hard-to-detect biases are better reasons for race-conscious affirmative action than the educational hunch of ‘diversity’ . . . .”137 In 2019, Professor
Melissa Murray published a New York Times op-ed hailing a lower court decision that upheld the legitimacy of affirmative action in Harvard College’s
admissions program, but she bemoaned the central place the accompanying opinion afforded to the diversity rationale. “The decision—and the
[diversity] logic on which it depends—is far removed from the remedial
rationales that ﬁrst animated affirmative action policies,” Murray lamented.138
133. McWhorter, supra note 123.
134. Id.
135. Orlando Patterson, Opinion, Affirmative Action: The Sequel, N.Y. Times (June 22,
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/22/opinion/affirmative-action-the-sequel.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
136. Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour From Brown to Grutter, 2004
U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 694. Diver suggests that a careful reading of Grutter reveals that the opinion can be understood to promote remedial goals. See id. at 721–22.
137. Randall Kennedy, Viewpoint: The Goal of Affirmative Action Should Not Be
‘Diversity’ but Righting Wrongs, Time (June 25, 2013), https://ideas.time.com/2013/
06/25/viewpoint-the-goal-of-affirmative-action-should-not-be-diversity-but-righting-wrongs
[https://perma.cc/S7VD-E7WD] [hereinafter Kennedy, Goal of Affirmative Action]. To be
clear, Kennedy believes that diversity should also be an acceptable justiﬁcation for affirmative action. But he contends that it should not be the sole acceptable justiﬁcation, and that
it is comparatively weaker. See id. (“[T]he court has abjured justiﬁcations for affirmative
action that are as compelling, if not more persuasive than the diversity rationale that is now
all too dominant as a basis for positive discrimination on behalf of marginalized racial
minorities.”).
138. Melissa Murray, Opinion, That Affirmative Action Ruling Was Good. Its Rationale,
Terrible., N.Y. Times (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/opinion/harvardaffirmative-action.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). For related criticisms, see
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Tellingly, even proponents of the diversity rationale have often suggested that its value lies primarily in its statesmanlike effort to defang a
contentious national issue, rather than from any actual underlying value
that stems from increased racial diversity. For example, Judge Henry
Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit commended
Justice Powell for his “moderation and statesmanship” in Bakke, which was
a “great service [to] the nation,” because the case held “the potential for
being another Dred Scott.”139 Then-Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson III—who
clerked for Justice Powell and would go on to become an esteemed federal
judge140—similarly suggested: “Invocation of diversity was Powell’s masterstroke. It was also his healing gesture. Diversity was the most acceptable
public rationale for affirmative action . . . .”141 Writing ﬁve years after
Bakke, Professor Paul J. Mishkin, who had helped defend U.C. Davis
Medical School, also glimpsed diplomatic wisdom in Powell’s approach.
“The Court took what was one of the most heated and polarized issues in
the nation,” Mishkin noted, “and by its handling defused much of the
heat.”142
Since Grutter, conservative opponents of affirmative action on the
Supreme Court have often drawn from these stock arguments to attack the
diversity rationale’s legitimacy. Justice Clarence Thomas contended that
the University of Michigan’s policies were driven by its obsession with “racial aesthetics” and “classroom aesthetics.”143 Diversity, Thomas charged,

Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1625 (2003) (noting that diversity, rather than “the need to address past and continuing racial barriers,” animated
Grutter); Dahlia Lithwick, The Legal Fiction of “Diversity”: Good Intentions and the
Unraveling of Affirmative Action, Slate (May 16, 2002), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2002/05/the-legal-ﬁction-of-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/U42T-ACST] (“We don’t even
get to talk about correcting for past racial imbalances or promoting minority advancement
as reasons to favor affirmative action. Those ideas are off the table.”); Kimberly Reyes,
Affirmative Action Shouldn’t Be About Diversity, Atlantic (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/affirmative-action-about-reparations-not-diversity/
578005/ [https://perma.cc/LF9D-8MYU].
139. Jeffries, supra note 95, at 498 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, U.S. Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-j-harvie-wilkinson-iii [https://
perma.cc/FF3C-5WJZ].
141. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, supra note 111, at 303. Writing in Bakke’s immediate aftermath, Wilkinson offered a relatively nuanced assessment of the decision. He was
in no way, however, an ardent defender of affirmative action. Over time, Wilkinson became
a committed opponent of race consciousness in education. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 158, 169–82
(2007).
142. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reﬂections on the Supreme Court and
the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 929 (1983).
143. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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is merely “a fashionable catchphrase” and “a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti.”144 Justice Scalia suggested that the University’s stated desire to
achieve a “critical mass” would fool only the “gullible,” as it was, in fact, “a
sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions.”145 Mocking
the notion that any tangible beneﬁt would ﬂow from increased racial diversity, Scalia further argued: “[Michigan Law School’s diversity rationale]
is not . . . an ‘educational beneﬁt’ on which students will be graded on
their law school transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested
by the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial
understanding).”146 Justice Kennedy, prior to his about-face in Fisher II,147
also noted that many defenders of affirmative action preferred the remediation rationale over the diversity rationale, and he claimed: “[T]he concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its
attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve
numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”148 Predictably, conservative Justices similarly heaped ridicule on the diversity rationale in both
Fisher I and Fisher II.149
It is extremely difficult to think of a contentious legal question on
which legal thinkers as varied as Guido Calabresi, Richard Delgado, Lino
Graglia, Sanford Levinson, Melissa Murray, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas would locate common ground. Yet all those legal minds agree that
the diversity rationale’s justiﬁcation for affirmative action suffers from profound ﬂaws. On the legitimacy of the diversity rationale, then, it would
seem that there is precious little diversity of thought.

144. Id. at 350, 354 n.3. Writing three years before Justice Thomas, Professor Levinson
similarly argued: “[B]ecause of Justice Powell’s emphasis on the almost unique legitimacy
of ‘diversity’ as a constitutional value, it has become the favorite catchword—indeed, it
would not be an exaggeration to say ‘mantra’—of those defending the use of racial or ethnic
preferences.” Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 573, 577 (2000).
145. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346–47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent in Grutter
voiced similar themes. See id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Law School’s
disparate admissions practices with respect to these minority groups demonstrate that its
alleged goal of ‘critical mass’ is simply a sham.”); id. at 379 (“Stripped of its ‘critical mass’
veil, the Law School’s program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.”);
see also Kennedy, For Discrimination, supra note 16, at 102–03 (observing invocations of
the “sham” language by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist).
146. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214–15 (2016) (upholding the University of Texas’s use of a raceconscious admissions policy to increase the diversity of its student body).
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that the
University of Texas’s defense of its affirmative action program was “less than candid”); Fisher
I, 570 U.S. 297, 320 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (casting doubt on “the educational
beneﬁts ﬂowing from student body diversity”); id. at 326 (“There is no principled distinction
between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational beneﬁts and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same beneﬁts.”).
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Notably, many of the attacks on diversity from both the left and the
right have emphasized the lack of empirical support for diversity’s
beneﬁts. Professor Kennedy, a supporter of affirmative action, has referred
to the diversity rationale as an “educational hunch.”150 Justice Alito,
dissenting in Fisher II, argued that the University of Texas had “merely
invoke[ed] ‘the educational beneﬁts of diversity’” and had failed to
“identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether its plan
is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests.”151 Professor
Schuck has explained the importance of this empirical question in stark
terms, writing that “the premises underlying the diversity rationale for
race-based affirmative action are empirically tenuous and theoretically
implausible. Policies justiﬁed under that rationale thus could not survive
if the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard were seriously applied.”152
Professor Schuck accurately assesses the stakes of the debate: If the
beneﬁts of diversity are proven to be illusory, it is difficult to imagine diversity remaining a compelling governmental interest for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, at least as interpreted by the modern Supreme
Court. Thus, if the diversity rationale falls, affirmative action in higher education may soon cease to be legal.
C.

The Existing Empirical Evidence on Diversity

This Article is not the ﬁrst empirical study of the effects of diversity,
and in this section we survey the literature on this subject. At the outset,
however, it is worth noting that there are three reasons why most existing
studies are not directly relevant to the constitutional questions at issue in
Bakke and its progeny. First, many of the most prominent academic studies
of affirmative action concern the effects of affirmative action on the individuals who are provided new opportunities by affirmative action policies,
rather than on the academic environment as a whole.153 Second, many
contexts lack objective measures that would permit a court or policymaker
to determine whether the diversity program is actually attaining its
goals154—a workable “metric,” in Justice Alito’s words.155 Third, many of
the studies involve contexts other than students’ experiences in higher education, where conditions may be very different.156
Within the legal academy and beyond, the most famous study of the
effects of affirmative action involves Professor Richard Sander’s “mismatch

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Kennedy, Goal of Affirmative Action, supra note 137.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Schuck, supra note 12, at 76.
See infra text accompanying notes 157–163.
See infra text accompanying notes 164–165, 169.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See infra text accompanying notes 174–180.
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theory.”157 Using data on bar passage rates and employment outcomes,
Professor Sander argued that affirmative action actually harmed Black law
students by causing them to enroll at schools where they could not succeed
academically.158 Sander’s work spawned a series of rebuttals,159 followed by
a substantial literature on the mismatch hypothesis,160 which taken together suggests that Sander’s theory is at best unsubstantiated. Much of
the research cited in briefs to the Supreme Court in Grutter and Fisher sim-

157. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 367, 449–54 (2004) [hereinafter Sander, Systemic Analysis] (attempting to substantiate the “mismatch theory”). For the popularization of this idea, see
generally Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor, Jr., Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts
Students It’s Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won’t Admit It (2012).
158. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 157, at 472–73 (suggesting that “racial
preferences end up producing fewer black lawyers each year than would be produced by a
race-blind system”).
159. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number
of Black Lawyers?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1807, 1809 (2005) (“While the mismatch hypothesis is
plausible, this response refutes the claim that affirmative action has reduced the number of
black lawyers.”); Daniel E. Ho, Affirmative Action’s Affirmative Actions: A Reply to Sander,
114 Yale L.J. 2011, 2011–12 (2005) (arguing, contrary to Sander, that there is “no evidence
that affirmative action reduces the bar performance of the students it is designed to help”);
Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114
Yale L.J. 1997, 1997 (2005) (arguing that Sander’s study “misapplies basic principles of
causal inference” and thus draws “internally inconsistent and invalid conclusions about the
effects of affirmative action”); see also Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A
Response to Ho, 114 Yale L.J. 2005, 2005 (2005) (responding to the criticism).
160. See, e.g., Gregory Camilli, Darrell D. Jackson, Chia-Yi Chiu & Ann Gallagher, The
Mismatch Hypothesis in Law School Admissions, 2 Widener J.L. Econ. & Race 165, 165–66,
166 n.3, 203–04 (2011) (deﬁning and testing the mismatch hypothesis and ﬁnding that “the
bar passage rates difference seems very modest relative to the substantial social networking
advantages of attending elite law schools”); David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale,
William C. Kidder & Richard O. Lempert, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 Stan.
L. Rev. 1855, 1857 (2005) (arguing that Sander’s work “rest[s] on a series of statistical errors,
oversights, and implausible assumptions”); André Douglas Pond Cummings, “Open Water”:
Affirmative Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming Predators—A Response to Richard
Sander, 44 Brandeis L.J. 795, 802–05 (2006) (rejecting Sander’s framing of racial issues and
his scapegoating of affirmative action policies); Harry G. Hutchison, Affirmative Action:
Between the Oikos and the Cosmos Review Essay: Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students It’s Intended to Help, and Why
Universities Won’t Admit It, 66 S.C. L. Rev. 119, 124–25 (2014) (insisting that we must move
beyond the empirical battle over the mismatch theory and address the deeper philosophical
issues underlying the debate over race relations); Beverly I. Moran, The Case for Black
Inferiority? What Must Be True if Professor Sander Is Right: A Response to a Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 5 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 41, 42–43
(2005) (pointing out the methodological ﬂaws and logical leaps that undergird Sander’s
work); David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to
Sander, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1915, 1919 (2005) (arguing that Sander’s empirical evidence “does
not come anywhere close to proving that most black lawyers would be better off” without
affirmative action).
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ilarly focused on the educational outcomes of individual students who beneﬁted from affirmative action.161 This is undoubtedly an important subject
of research in its own right,162 and it would gain constitutional importance
if the Court came to view the remediation of past or ongoing discrimination as a compelling governmental interest. But the diversity rationale is
not based primarily on claims that individuals beneﬁt. Rather, it rests on
the idea that diversity is beneﬁcial for academic institutions as a whole—
that the learning undertaken and the academic work produced at those
institutions will be stronger if the institutions are diverse. Accordingly, this
individual-based literature does not speak directly to that institutionally
based question as the Supreme Court has consistently framed it.163
Several qualitative studies analyze the effects of diversity in the classroom.164 These studies, based on surveys of and conversations with students, ﬁnd that students perceive that greater diversity improves their
educational experience.165 Some evidence suggests that greater racial di-

161. See, e.g., William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions 219 (rev. ed. 2018)
(discussing survey data that examines the beneﬁts of diversity); Patricia Gurin, Expert
Report of Patricia Gurin, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 363, 422 (1999) (summarizing data that
“strongly support the theory [underlying affirmative action] by showing that students, indeed, acquire a very broad range of skills, motivations, values, and cognitive capacities from
diverse peers when provided with the appropriate opportunities to do so”); Richard O.
Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 395, 495 (2000) (reporting that
a Michigan Law School survey found that former students believed diversity “contribut[ed]
considerably to their classroom experience”).
162. See, e.g., Christopher S. Cotton, Brent R. Hickman & Joseph P. Price, Affirmative
Action and Human Capital Investment: Evidence From a Randomized Field Experiment, 40
J. Lab. Econ. 157, 159–60 (2022) (studying the impact of affirmative action policies on student effort).
163. There is at least some research that has examined the impact of team diversity on
performance in academic settings. See, e.g., Sophie Calder-Wang, Paul A. Gompers & Kevin
Huang, Diversity and Performance in Entrepreneurial Teams 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 28684, 2021), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/
w28684/w28684.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8KW-QUZS] (ﬁnding that exogenously imposed
diversity decreased the performance of teams of MBA students participating in a required
course to propose microbusinesses, while endogenously formed diversity eliminated this
negative performance effect).
164. Professor Meera Deo is perhaps the leading contemporary legal scholar in this
area. See generally Meera E. Deo, Unequal Profession: Race and Gender in Legal Academia
(2019) (critiquing and empirically examining inequalities in legal academia).
165. See Gary Orﬁeld & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student
Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of
Affirmative Action 143, 154–69 (Gary Orﬁeld & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001) (discussing
the results of a student survey with questions on racial diversity’s impact on their educational
experience); Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solórzano, Affirmative Action, Educational Equity
and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 237, 238 (2001) (examining the experience of students of color in
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versity is correlated with increased discussions of racial issues in the classroom166 and cross-racial interpersonal relationships.167 Greater diversity is
also associated with greater participation of minority students in classrooms.168 Nonetheless, this literature seems unlikely to satisfy Supreme
Court Justices searching for evidence of diversity’s impact on actual learning outcomes. As one social scientist explains:
Determining the extent to which diversity among students affects the learning process in a classroom is inherently a very difﬁcult task. Simply measuring learning outcomes is a challenge;
quantitative indicators such as grades and standardised tests have
well-known weaknesses as measures of what, or how well, a student has learned. It is even more challenging to isolate in a systematic way the impact of any one factor—such as racial/ethnic
diversity—on the learning process.169
In addition to research on the impact of diversity on learning in educational settings, there is also research on the impact of diversity on the
production of academic scholarship. Over time, a growing share of academic scholarship has been conducted by collaborative teams as opposed
to scientists and scholars working alone.170 Researchers studying this move
toward team production have found evidence that collaborative teams are
more likely than solo authors to produce innovative scientiﬁc articles and

their campus environments and discussing student comments on perceived beneﬁts of diversity on campus); Meera E. Deo, Walter R. Allen, A.T. Panter, Charles Daye & Linda
Wightman, Struggles & Support: Diversity in U.S. Law Schools, 23 Nat’l Black L.J. 71, 77
(2010) (discussing results of a survey examining law student support for diversity, demonstrating both white and minority students feel that diversity enhances their learning
environment).
166. Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational Effects of Racial Diversity on Campus,
in Diversity Challenged, supra note 165, at 175, 181 (ﬁnding a correlation between racial
diversity and (1) cross-racial socializing and (2) discussion of racial issues); Meera E. Deo,
Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3115, 3138 (2015) (“Three
interrelated themes emerge: (1) educational diversity allows for a richer range of perspectives to be included in the classroom, (2) with personal context helping to illuminate black
letter law, and (3) providing beneﬁts that will reach into future legal practice.”).
167. See Nancy E. Dowd, Kenneth B. Nunn & Jane E. Pendergast, Diversity Matters:
Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 11, 25 (2003)
(discussing survey results showing that most students agreed that diversity on campus improved their educational experience and interpersonal relationships with students of other
races).
168. See Carole J. Buckner, Realizing Grutter v. Bollinger’s “Compelling Educational
Beneﬁts of Diversity”—Transforming Aspirational Rhetoric Into Experience, 72 UMKC L.
Rev. 877, 883–93 (2004) (synthesizing empirical research and summarizing studies on the
experience of minority students in law school, including participation in class).
169. Thomas E. Weisskopf, Consequences of Affirmative Action in US Higher
Education: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies, 36 Econ. & Pol. Weekly 4719, 4724 (2001).
170. See Stefan Wuchty, Benjamin F. Jones & Brian Uzzi, The Increasing Dominance of
Teams in Production of Knowledge, 316 Science 1036, 1036 (2007) (noting an increase in
working in teams throughout many different areas of scholarship).
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patents.171 As an important corollary, other researchers have found that
collaborative teams with ethnically homogenous members are more likely
to publish their scholarship in lower-impact journals, and teams with ethnically diverse members are more likely to publish their scholarship in
higher-impact journals and receive more citations.172 Similarly, other research has also found that greater gender diversity on teams improves outcomes.173
Finally, several papers study the inﬂuence of diversity on the outcomes
of groups or teams outside of the academic context. For instance, researchers have explored the impact of corporate board diversity on ﬁrm performance,174 jury diversity on conviction rates and sentencing,175 team
diversity on efficiently completing tasks,176 and police departments adopting affirmative action policies on police responsiveness to Black victimization.177 Although the evidence on the effect of diversity on group

171. See id. at 1037 (ﬁnding that teams dominate the top of the citation distribution in
the examined domains).
172. See Richard B. Freeman & Wei Huang, Collaborating With People Like Me: Ethnic
Co-Authorship Within the United States, 33 J. Lab. Econ. S289, S313 (2015) (“A reasonable
interpretation of the pattern for homophily, addresses, and references is that greater diversity and breadth of knowledge of a research team contributes to the quality of the scientiﬁc
papers that the team produces.”).
173. See Julia B. Bear & Anita Williams Woolley, The Role of Gender in Team
Collaboration and Performance, 36 Interdisc. Sci. Rev. 146, 151 (2011) ("[G]ender diversity
can also enhance group processes, which are increasingly important as collaboration becomes a centerpiece in the production of science.”).
174. See, e.g., Adams & Ferreira, supra note 25, at 291 (showing that female directors
have a signiﬁcant impact on board inputs and ﬁrm outcomes); Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K.
Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female
Board Representation, 127 Q.J. Econ. 137, 188 (2012) (“[I]mposing a severe constraint on
the choice of directors leads to economically large declines in value.”); Daehyun Kim &
Laura T. Starks, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do Women Contribute Unique
Skills?, 106 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 267, 270 (2016) (ﬁnding that gender diversity in
the board improves ﬁrm value); David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in
Corporate Leadership? Evidence From Quotas, 5 Am. Econ. J.: Applied Econ. 136, 165
(2013) (discussing how gender quotas can affect corporate strategy).
175. See, e.g., Anwar et al., A Jury of Her Peers, supra note 25, at 603; Shamena Anwar,
Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J.
Econ. 1017, 1017–22 (2012) [hereinafter Anwar et al., Jury Race in Criminal Trials];
Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Role of Age in Jury Selection and
Trial Outcomes, 57 J.L. & Econ. 1001, 1001–05 (2014); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial
Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition
on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 597, 597–98, 608–10 (2006); Mark Hoekstra
& Brittany Street, The Effect of Own-Gender Juries on Conviction Rates 1–3, 14–16 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25013, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/
ﬁles/working_papers/w25013/w25013.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM93-XGL3].
176. See, e.g., Benjamin Marx, Vincent Pons & Tavneet Suri, Diversity and Team
Performance in a Kenyan Organization, 197 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 1–3, 9–17 (2021).
177. See, e.g., Anna Harvey & Taylor Mattia, Reducing Racial Disparities in Crime
Victimization: Evidence From Employment Discrimination Litigation 2–4, 21–23 (Apr. 1,
2021) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript). Studying the effects
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performance is mixed, some research has found that even a modest increase in diversity can have profound effects on group performance. For
instance, a study of felony trials in Florida from 2000 to 2010 found that
all-white jury pools convicted Black defendants 81% of the time and white
defendants 66% of the time but that juries with at least one Black potential
juror convicted Black defendants 71% of the time and white defendants
73% of the time.178 Another study, which an amicus brief in Fisher I cited,179
found that diverse groups outperformed nondiverse groups at identifying
hypothetical murder suspects from clues.180 But, of course, this line of research addresses situations far aﬁeld from higher education.
We thus believe that student-run law reviews, in which student editors
work as a team to select and edit articles, offer an advantageous context
for studying the inﬂuence of diversity policies on group performance. Law
reviews generate a publicly observable and quantiﬁable outcome: article
impact, as measured by citations.181 Even if adopting a diversity policy only
slightly increases the diversity of a law review, results such as the jury study
described above suggest that it is possible for even minimal increases in
diversity to meaningfully change group decisionmaking.182 The next Part
describes the data and empirical methods that we employ to estimate the
effects of diversity on the performance of student-run law reviews.
II. DATA
To study the effect of law review diversity policies on citations to law
review articles, we built a dataset that includes information on citations to
12,889 articles that were published by leading law reviews between 1960
and 2018. In this Part, we describe the construction of that dataset.

of group diversity on performance is related to a large literature on peer effects. For a discussion, see generally, e.g., Zeynep Hansen, Hideo Owan & Jie Pan, The Impact of Group
Diversity on Class Performance: Evidence From College Classrooms, 23 Educ. Econ. 238
(2015).
178. See Anwar et al., Jury Race in Criminal Trials, supra note 175, at 1019.
179. Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 18, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3418596 [hereinafter Post & Minow Amicus Brief].
180. Katherine W. Phillips, Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Surface-Level
Diversity and Decision-Making in Groups: When Does Deep-Level Similarity Help?, 9 Grp.
Processes & Intergroup Rels. 467, 477 (2006).
181. Again, there are important limitations to the use of citations as a measure of the
work being done by law review boards. We discuss these limitations at length. See infra section II.C. Nonetheless, citations offer an important, reliable, and widely adopted means of
judging the performance of law review boards over time.
182. For other examples of increases in group diversity changing group behavior, see
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 25, at 293 (ﬁnding that “gender-diverse [corporate] boards
are tougher monitors”); Anwar et al., A Jury of Her Peers, supra note 25, at 5 (ﬁnding that
“female representation on juries signiﬁcantly increased conviction rates for sex offence
cases”).
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Law Reviews in Our Study

Our research focuses on the ﬂagship law reviews of the top twenty law
schools, as determined by the law school rankings published by U.S. News
& World Report.183 These law reviews are: California Law Review, Columbia
Law Review, Cornell Law Review, Duke Law Journal, Georgetown Law Journal,
Harvard Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Minnesota Law Review, New York
University Law Review, Northwestern University Law Review, Southern
California Law Review, Stanford Law Review, Texas Law Review, UCLA Law
Review, University of Chicago Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, Virginia Law Review, Washington University
Law Review, and Yale Law Journal.184
Admittedly, in selecting the law reviews to study, any cutoff is arbitrary.
We use the law reviews at the top twenty law schools for a number of reasons, including that the top ranked law schools have been relatively stable
over time; that a New York Times article in 1995 reports on diversity policies
of the top twenty law schools;185 that the top law schools and law reviews
have high proﬁles; and that articles in the top law reviews are widely
cited.186 For these and other reasons, there has been more coverage of
their policies, and so it is easier to collect information about their diversity
policies.
B.

Changes in Diversity Policies

For these twenty ﬂagship law reviews, we set out to identify every instance where they adopted or repealed a diversity policy between 1960 and
2018. We deﬁne a diversity policy as a policy under which a law journal
takes into consideration the race or ethnicity of applicants when selecting
new editors for membership at the end of their ﬁrst year of law school.
Accordingly, we do not treat additional outreach, by itself, as the creation
of a diversity policy.187 Similarly, a policy that only concerns gender, like
the Harvard Law Review’s 2013 policy change, is not considered a diversity
183. We speciﬁcally used the 2019 U.S. News & World Report law school rankings to identify these ﬂagship law reviews. We use the 2019 rankings, which were released in March 2018,
because they were the most current version available when we began this project in 2018.
See Staci Zaretsky, Behold, The Full 2019 U.S. News Law School Rankings Leak (1–144),
Above the Law (Mar. 14, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/behold-the-full-2019-us-news-law-school-rankings-leak-1-144-rnp/ [https://perma.cc/3FJU-T3K2].
184. Id.
185. See Lisa Anderson, Law Review Masks Diversity in a New Admission System, N.Y.
Times (July 7, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/07/us/law-review-masks-diversityin-a-new-admission-system.html [https://perma.cc/ZP2B-7N4A].
186. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Reviews, 29 J. Legal Stud. 389, 392
(2000).
187. For an example of such a program that involved additional outreach but not consideration of diversity at the selection stage, see About the Stanford Law Review, Stan. L. Rev.
(Dec. 2, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20111202175044/https:/www.stanfordlawreview.
org/about/ [https://perma.cc/9AFX-VBD6] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
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policy for purposes of our study.188 We adopt this deﬁnition because it
largely matches the issues presented in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher II.
To identify these policies, we ﬁrst conducted extensive searches for
news reports, academic articles, and other information on the topic. We
then surveyed current and former editors of the law reviews about changes
to diversity policies during their tenures as editors.189 Through this process, we identiﬁed twenty-two extensive margin changes to diversity policies made by sixteen law reviews.190 Table 1 provides a list of these changes.
The Appendix lists the sources for these policies.

188. See Carl Straumsheim, Tackling Gender Disparity, Inside Higher Ed. (Feb. 27,
2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/02/27/harvard-law-review-considergender-editor-selection-process [https://perma.cc/77PQ-DFDW].
189. In addition to the use of typical sources such as law ﬁrm websites and LinkedIn,
our search for former editors involved other, more obscure methods. In one case, we left a
phone message at the hospital where a former editor—who received a J.D. and M.D. but
never practiced law—is now working as a physician. In another, we sent a physical letter
through the U.S. mail to a former editor who had no listed email address or phone number.
In these cases and others, we are very grateful to the editors who responded to our inquiries.
190. By extensive margin changes, we mean a change where a diversity policy is adopted
or rescinded. This is in contrast to intensive margin changes, which mean a change in the
number of diverse editors that a diversity policy helped become members of the law review.
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TABLE 1. EXTENSIVE MARGIN CHANGES IN LAW REVIEW DIVERSITY POLICIES
Journal

Year

Journal

Year

Berkeley

1969

Georgetown

1991

Berkeley

1996+

Georgetown

1994

Georgetown

2007

UCLA

2007

Yale

2012

Northwestern

2016

Chicago

2017

Duke

2017

Stanford

2017

WashU

2020

Texas

Never

USC

Never

Vanderbilt

Never

Harvard
Michigan
NYU

1982
1983
1983

Penn

1985

Penn

1989+*

Penn

1994

Minnesota
Virginia
Columbia
Cornell

1987*
1987
1989
1989

+ indicates the journal abolished an existing diversity policy
* indicates our best guess based on incomplete or conﬂicting evidence
There are three caveats about the diversity policies worth noting. First,
although we communicated extensively with the former editors and supervising faculty members of these law reviews, their memories are not perfect, and some changes to diversity policies may have been forgotten over
time. In particular, there are two policy changes whose dates we are unable
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to identify with high conﬁdence. The editors of the Minnesota Law Review
and faculty at the University of Minnesota Law School are not certain
whether a diversity policy was adopted in 1983 or in 1987.191 The University
of Pennsylvania Law Review eliminated its 1984 diversity policy at some
point between 1989 and 1992, but we cannot determine the precise date.192
It is thus possible that there are changes to diversity policies that we do not
perfectly capture.
Second, the forms that the diversity policies take are not identical. For
example, some of the policies likely involved the consideration of demographic factors directly, whereas others involved placing weight on personal statements that could include information relevant to diversity. In
addition, the diversity policies applied to different numbers of available
positions on the law review. At some journals, for instance, only a small
number of new editors were chosen in part based upon their personal
statements; at other journals, personal statements were relevant to the selection of a majority of the editors.193 Moreover, even journals with similar
diversity policies may have selected different numbers of editors pursuant
to those policies, particularly given that many of the policies treat the personal statement as just one factor of many. Without being party to a law
journal’s conﬁdential decisionmaking, it is impossible to know how many
191. We had extensive email correspondence with individuals who ran the Minnesota
Law Review from 1979 to 1989. More speciﬁcally, we emailed every Editor-in-Chief from the
relevant periods for whom we could ﬁnd contact info, as well as the faculty advisors for those
periods. Here is what the Editors-in-Chief and managing editors said: 1982–1983: no policy;
1983–1984: no policy; 1984–1985: the Editor-in-Chief thinks that there was a policy (in that
the law review used a personal statement as part of the criteria for selecting members) and
thinks there was a policy the previous year, while managing editors from those years cannot
recall; 1985–1986: nobody we were able to contact can recall; 1986–1987: no policy; 1987–
1988: a policy existed, according to the next year’s Editor-in-Chief, but we got no response
from the Editor-in-Chief from 1987–1988; 1988–1989: policy existed. Our best guess is that
the diversity policy began in the 1987–1988 year, meaning that it applied to the members
chosen in Summer 1987, and the articles that the law review published starting in Fall 1987.
But it is possible that it actually began earlier, back in Summer 1983 or Summer 1984. As a
result, for our primary analysis, we exclude the Minnesota Law Review from our sample. As a
robustness check, however, we reran the speciﬁcations including Minnesota in the sample,
separately coding Minnesota’s policy starting in 1983 and 1987. The results change little in
an economic sense and do not differ in a statistical sense. The estimates are slightly more
negative in some speciﬁcations, including the panel regression using mean citations, and
are slightly more positive in our preferred speciﬁcations, including the stacked event study
using mean and median citations.
192. We corresponded extensively with the student editors who ran the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review during the relevant time period. Leading student editors conﬁrmed
to us that a diversity policy existed in 1988, but they disagreed as to whether a policy existed
in 1989 and 1990 or whether it had been repealed. By 1992, there appeared to be no doubt
that a policy no longer existed.
193. Our information regarding these details is highly incomplete. Many newspaper stories do not report details regarding the scope of diversity policies, and we promised former
law review editors that we would not ask them to reveal these details as a condition of their
correspondence with us. The information that we have regarding the scope of diversity policies is reported in the Appendix.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3856280

366

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:331

editors were selected as a result of a given policy change. Accordingly, even
though these different policies likely had different effects on the share of
diverse editors selected relative to the total membership of the journals,
we treat the adoption or elimination of diversity policies uniformly.194 As a
result, we estimate the effect of a law review adopting a diversity policy,
rather than the effect of the change in composition of the members that
are on the law review.195 Or, put another way, we study changes to the extensive margin of diversity policies (whether there is a diversity policy or
not) and not changes to the intensive margin of diversity polices (the extent to which a diversity policy leads to the selection of diverse editors).
Third, law reviews that do not formally adopt diversity policies may
still use a variety of strategies to increase the diversity of their membership.
For instance, journals may decide not to factor in diversity when reviewing
applicants but still decide to host information sessions designed to encourage diverse students to participate in the writing competitions and provide
mentoring to those students in advance of the competition.
Importantly, these three limitations—that is, forgotten changes to diversity policies, dissimilarities between policies, and potential informal efforts to promote diversity—likely bias our estimates toward ﬁnding no
effect. This is because these limitations create measurement error in our
key independent variable—the existence of a diversity policy. Measurement error in the independent variable creates attenuation bias, which
drives regression coefficients toward zero.196 In other words, to the extent

194. Ideally, we could parametrize the size of the expected treatment by using a continuous variable that accounted for the magnitude of the policy changes. But, because the
policy changes take different forms, we are unable to do so. We cannot observe how the
diversity of law review membership actually changed in light of these policies or even if it
changed at all. It is possible that the diversity policies did not make the law reviews more
diverse, and our results are driven by the publicity surrounding the diversity policies or some
other coincidental effect.
However, this strikes us as highly unlikely. One reason is that many of the diversity policies were never publicized. Another reason is that diversity policies in other contexts have
typically led to increased diversity, even though the effects are sometimes modest. See, e.g.,
Harry J. Holzer & David Neumark, Affirmative Action: What Do We Know?, 25 J. Pol’y
Analysis & Mgmt. 463, 471, 475 (2006) (ﬁnding a modest impact in the contexts of employment and higher education); Jeremy Ashkenas, Haeyoun Park & Adam Pearce, Even With
Affirmative Action, Blacks and Hispanics Are More Underrepresented at Top Colleges Than
35 Years Ago, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/
24/us/affirmative-action.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The number of
Hispanic and black freshmen on the University of California campuses declined immediately after California’s affirmative action ban took effect, especially at the most sought-after
campuses . . . .”).
195. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra section III.B.
196. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob
Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Legal Rasputins? Law Clerk Inﬂuence on Voting at the
U.S. Supreme Court, 35 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (2019) (noting challenges in assessing whether
law clerks inﬂuence judicial decisionmaking).
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that attenuation bias is present, it would lead our estimates to understate
the true magnitude of the effects.
C.

Citations and Subjects of Law Review Articles

For these twenty ﬂagship law reviews, we built a dataset containing the
information on all full-length research articles they published from 1960
to 2018. It is important to note that there are several types of publications
in law reviews beyond just full-length research articles. We focus on fulllength research articles because these are the pieces that law reviews exercise the greatest discretion in selecting for publication.197 In addition, the
claims in the lawsuits ﬁled against the Harvard Law Review and New York
University Law Review alleged speciﬁcally that these are the articles for
which quality suffers as a result of diversity policies.198 This means that our
sample excludes several types of publications. First, we exclude publications by student editors, known as student comments or notes. Second, we
exclude book reviews. Third, we exclude shorter publications, known as
essays.199 Fourth, because articles that are published as part of a symposium
typically do not go through the same selection process, we exclude them
as well.
As a measure of article impact, we identiﬁed the citations to each article. Citation counts are hardly the sole way of assessing legal scholarship’s
impact.200 And there are surely superb articles (and superb scholars) that
receive few citations, just as there are deﬁcient articles and scholars that
are highly cited. Nonetheless, citation counts are a widely used measure of
impact.201 In addition, law review editors themselves aim to publish inﬂuential scholarship, with inﬂuence being measured (by the editors) in considerable part through citation counts.202 Accordingly, we evaluate whether
197. Such discretion arises as a result of the high volume of full-length research articles
submitted. See, e.g., When to Submit Articles and Essays, supra note 22, at 1–2 (detailing
the Yale Law Journal’s receipt of at least 1,700 pieces per cycle over the period of three publication cycles, from which only sixteen to twenty pieces were selected per cycle for publication). Legal academia also prioritizes full-length research articles when evaluating
professors. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Value of Online Law Review Supplements for
Junior and Senior Faculty, 33 Touro L. Rev. 387, 393 (2017) (“Clearly, full-length law review
articles are the quintessential scholarly work for tenure-track law faculty.”).
198. Fac., Alumni & Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. N.Y. Univ. L. Rev., No. 18
Civ. 9184 (ER), 2020 WL 1529311, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020); Fac., Alumni & Students
Opposed to Racial Preferences v. Harvard L. Rev., No. 18-12105-LTS, 2019 WL 3754023, at
*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2019).
199. This choice may be overinclusive because many journals use the same process to
select essays as they do to select articles, and they are often cited and treated the same way.
Nonetheless, we adopt it out of an abundance of caution in order to avoid biasing our data
against journals that publish essays.
200. We prefer the term “article impact” or “article inﬂuence” rather than “article quality” because quality is in the eye of the beholder, but impact can be reasonably measured.
However, we use the two terms interchangeably throughout this Article.
201. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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law reviews are succeeding at the goal that they are themselves pursuing.
Citation counts are thus a reasonable way of assessing how diversity policies
affect law reviews’ efforts to achieve their own stated objectives.
We collected data on each article’s citations from HeinOnline.
HeinOnline is a searchable internet database containing information on
law review publications.203 HeinOnline has a unique URL for every law review
article, which lists every citation it has received. It is worth noting that, like
all citation databases, HeinOnline may not perfectly capture the citations
to every article. This is because HeinOnline focuses on counting citations
to law review publications from other law review publications. It thus does
not include full information on citations to law review articles from many
non-law journals or academic books. Despite this limitation, HeinOnline
is still considered the most comprehensive database of legal research and
is a standard database for measuring citations within the legal academy.204
Moreover, HeinOnline citations may soon be used as part of the U.S. News
& World Report rankings of law schools, which reﬂects their status as the
standard way to measure citations to legal research.205
In addition to collecting article citations from HeinOnline, we also
scraped available information on the article subjects. HeinOnline lists subjects for most articles, and articles can have multiple subjects. In total,
HeinOnline includes information on roughly 1,500 subjects. However, for
our empirical analysis, we focus on the top ﬁfty most common subjects. To
illustrate, Figure 1 reports the average mean citations for articles of each
of these subjects after controlling for journal and year.206

203. Journals and Periodicals, HeinOnline, https://home.heinonline.org/content/
journals-and-periodicals/ [https://perma.cc/9UT2-6A69] (last visited Sept. 28, 2021).
204. There is a substantial body of research in peer-reviewed law and economics journals
that utilizes citations from HeinOnline. See, e.g., Adam Chilton, Jonathan S. Masur & Kyle
Rozema, Political Ideology and the Law Review Selection Process, 22 Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
211, 220 (2020); Adam Chilton, Jonathan S. Masur & Kyle Rozema, Rethinking Law School
Tenure Standards, 50 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6 (2021); Paul J. Heald & Ted Sichelman, Ranking
the Academic Impact of 100 American Law Schools, 60 Jurimetrics 4–39 (2019).
205. For a discussion of this development, see Ted Sichelman, A Defense and
Explanation of the U.S. News ‘Citation’ Ranking, TaxProf Blog (Mar. 20, 2019), https://
taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/03/sichelman-a-defense-and-explanation-of-theus-news-citation-ranking.html [https://perma.cc/TQU4-5CDB].
206. To generate the results for Figure 1, using our sample of articles, we regressed citations on year and journal ﬁxed effects. We then recovered the residuals from these regressions and added back the overall average citations to the residuals. We then calculated the
averages by subject.
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN
We preregistered the research design that we use for this study before
we had the complete dataset. This Part ﬁrst explains the rationale of that
precommitment. We then describe the two approaches that we use to estimate the effects of diversity policies on citations: (1) two-way ﬁxed effects
regressions, and (2) a stacked event study.
A.

Pre-Registration

When conducting empirical research, scholars have substantial discretion regarding how to resolve a wide range of issues. As just one example,
for any given study, there are many potential control variables that could
be included in a regression. The set of justiﬁable choices that researchers
could plausibly make while still being consistent with best practices are
sometimes called “researcher degrees of freedom.”207 Unfortunately, however, even if researchers are trying to be unbiased, there is reason to believe they may—perhaps even unconsciously—make choices in ways that
increase the likelihood that they would produce a preferred result.208 In
these situations, one way to ensure the credibility of reported results is to
preregister a research design prior to conducting the empirical analysis.
On December 3, 2018, we posted our research design to precommit
ourselves to the approaches and speciﬁcations we use in this Article.209 We
posted this after we had initial results but before we had the ﬁnal dataset
on all the instances that a law review adopted, amended, or repealed a
diversity policy. After additional efforts to document diversity policies, we
reran the speciﬁcations to which we precommitted initially. We have added
robustness checks to this draft, but the main approaches and speciﬁcations
are the same with one exception: the regressions where we control for article subjects. We added these speciﬁcations to our initial approach because HeinOnline ﬁrst began reporting article subjects after we initially
scraped the website. Once HeinOnline reported article subjects, we rescraped the website to obtain information on article subjects, which we

207. See Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology:
Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as
Signiﬁcant, 22 Psych. Sci. 1359, 1359–62 (2011) (describing “researcher degrees of freedom” as a construct to understand the range of decisions a researcher can make in the
course of collecting and analyzing data).
208. See Andrew Gelman & Eric Loken, The Garden of Forking Paths: Why Multiple
Comparisons Can Be a Problem, Even When There Is No ‘Fishing Expedition’ or ‘PHacking’ and the Research Hypothesis Was Posited Ahead of Time 4–10 (Nov. 14, 2013)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing prominent
research papers in which results were statistically signiﬁcant because researchers could
choose among variable interactions, exclude data, and isolate individual studies).
209. Adam Chilton, Jonathan S. Masur & Kyle Rozema, Affirmative Action in Law
Reviews (Dec. 2, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295334 [https://perma.cc/EJ9G-EJB8]
[hereinafter Chilton et al., Preregistered Study] (unpublished manuscript).
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then added as controls in additional speciﬁcations (speciﬁcally, we added
Panel B of Tables 3 and 4).
B.

Two-Way Fixed Effects Regressions

Using the panel data, we begin the analysis with a standard differencein-differences (DiD) approach by estimating the two-way ﬁxed effects
speciﬁcation in Equation 1210
yijt = α + βPolicyjt + ψt + ηj + δjt + εijt
(1)
for article i in law review j and year t. The dependent variable yijt is article
citations. The speciﬁcation includes year ﬁxed effects ψt, law review ﬁxed
effects ηj, and law review linear time trends δjt. Policyjt is an indicator variable for whether law review j has a diversity policy in place in year t. This
analysis therefore assumes all policies have the same effect on article impact and only uses extensive margin changes of a diversity policy in a journal as variation to estimate β (including any adoption or removal of a
diversity policy). The coefficient of interest is β, which indicates the average change in citations attributable to diversity policies. Standard errors
are clustered by journal.
Equation 1 is estimated on the panel data using articles since 1960.211
We follow a standard practice in the literature and focus on articles that
have had time to be cited.212 In particular, we allow articles to be cited for
at least ﬁve years, so we exclude articles published after 2013.213
One important additional aspect of our research design is that we account for the staggered way that a diversity policy takes effect. In particular,
there are two different pathways by which a diversity policy could change
the articles published, and these pathways inform how we should code a
policy as taking effect. First, in the immediate aftermath of a policy being
adopted, we anticipate that the second-year student members of the law
review will be more diverse. These second-year students can inﬂuence ar-

210. A DiD estimation involves looking at the change in the difference between two
quantities over time. So, for instance, articles published in the Harvard Law Review and
Stanford Law Review were likely cited different numbers of times before either journal implemented a diversity policy. A DiD estimation compares the difference between the two law
reviews before the Harvard Law Review implements a diversity policy with the difference
between the two law reviews after the Harvard Law Review implements a diversity policy. The
idea is that any sort of secular trend—for instance, law reviews being cited more in general—
will affect both journals, so the change in the difference can more plausibly be attributed to
the Harvard Law Review’s implementation of a diversity policy.
211. The results are similar if we restrict our panel to starting in later years when the
policies we study in our stacked event study speciﬁcations go into effect.
212. See, e.g., James J. Heckman & Sidharth Moktan, Publishing and Promotion in
Economics: The Tyranny of the Top Five, 58 J. Econ. Literature 419, 445 (2020) (limiting
analysis to articles published after 2010).
213. The results are very similar if we cut the sample a few years earlier or later.
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ticle selection and impact in the year after the policy was adopted by reviewing and editing articles over the course of that year.214 Second, starting
the second year after a diversity policy is adopted, the more diverse editors
may ascend to positions on the law review board. The board members can
further inﬂuence article selection and quality because they vote on which
articles to accept and have control over the journal more generally.215
To account for both possible pathways, we ﬁrst report results where
we deﬁne an event as starting in the ﬁrst year after a policy was enacted
and then report results of a distributed lag model, in which we also include
the policy lagged by one year (Policyjt-1). A distributed lag model is a
regression speciﬁcation that allows the effect of a given variable to take
place in different time periods and then aggregates those effects together
to estimate the joint effect. Given the two pathways, this approach may be
preferred. In the distributed lag model, we estimate the two-year
incremental changes in citations and report the cumulative effect (the
sum of the coefficients).216
C.

Stacked Event Study

Although the two-way ﬁxed effects approach is a commonly used research design,217 a growing econometric literature has shown that it has

214. Consider, for instance, a diversity policy adopted during the 2020–2021 academic
year. That policy would affect the new law review members chosen in Summer 2021 and,
thus, the articles they edit from Summer 2021 through February 2022. Those articles will
generally be published during the 2021–2022 academic year, the year after the policy is enacted. The new law review members (from the Class of 2023) will then assume board positions in February 2022. At that point, the diversity policy will have a further effect on the
articles selected. These articles will generally be published during the 2022–2023 academic
year, two years after the policy was implemented.
215. This is true at all journals in our sample but Harvard and NYU, at which the entire
law review membership votes on article selection.
216. If an effect of an intervention is expected to emerge gradually after it takes effect,
using a distributed lag model is a standard approach in the social science literature. See,
e.g., Olivier Deschênes & Enrico Moretti, Extreme Weather Events, Mortality, and
Migration, 91 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 659, 667 (2009) (using a distributed lag structure to study
the effects of extreme weather on life expectancy); Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David
A. Hyman, Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine, Revisited, 51 J. Health Econ. 84, 92
(2017) (using a distributed lag model to study whether tort reform reduces defensive medicine and healthcare spending); Kyle Rozema, Tax Incidence in a Vertical Supply Chain:
Evidence From Cigarette Wholesale Prices, 71 Nat’l Tax J. 427, 428–29 (2018) (using a distributed lag model to study how the “burden of consumption taxes not borne by consumers
is shared between upstream ﬁrms . . . and downstream ﬁrms”).
217. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport,
Collective Bargaining Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence From Florida, 38 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 1, 5 (2020) (using a ﬁxed effects approach to study the effect of law enforcement
bargaining rights on misconduct incidents); Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does
Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence From Secure Communities, 57 J.L. &
Econ. 937, 958–66 (2014) (using a ﬁxed effects approach to examine the impact of a federal
program on immigrant crime rates).
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limitations,218 especially in settings where there is staggered rollout in
treatment timing.219 Because the treatments in our research setting are
staggered (that is, law reviews adopted diversity policies in different years),
we thus also follow current best practices and use a stacked event study
research design. In particular, we assess changes in citations in the ﬁve
years before and after the adoption of each diversity policy.
Event studies are a widely used method in the empirical social sciences.220 An event study is an empirical method that assesses the effect of
a given intervention by establishing a control group that is likely to have
developed similarly over time to the treatment group that received the intervention and then measures changes in the outcome of interest for the
treatment group relative to the control group from before and after the
intervention.221 A stacked event study is where there are multiple treatment events (e.g., different law reviews adopting diversity policies at different times) that can be “stacked” on top of each other and analyzed as part
of a single event study framework.222
218. See, e.g., Andrew Goodman-Bacon, Difference-in-Differences With Variation in
Treatment Timing, 225 J. Econometrics 254, 255 (2021) (noting some limitations of the twoway ﬁxed effects approach, such as knowing “relatively little about . . . [the model] when
treatment timing varies”).
219. See, e.g., Susan Athey & Guido W. Imbens, Design-Based Analysis in Difference-inDifferences Settings With Staggered Adoption, 226 J. Econometrics 62, 62 (2022) (using a
staggered design approach when estimating the average treatment effect in a setting with
panel data); Brantly Callaway & Pedro H.C. Sant’Anna, Difference-in-Differences With
Multiple Time Periods, 225 J. Econometrics 200, 201 (2021) (noting the issues of interpreting the results for two-way ﬁxed effects regressions); Kosuke Imai & In Song Kim, On the
Use of Two-Way Fixed Effects Regression Models for Causal Inference With Panel Data, 29
Pol. Analysis 405, 413 (2021) (“We show that contrary to the common belief, the standard
two-way ﬁxed effects regression estimator does not represent a design-based, nonparametric
causal estimator. It is impossible to simultaneously adjust for unobserved unit-speciﬁc and
time-speciﬁc confounders.”); Anton Strezhnev, Semiparametric Weighting Estimators for
Multi-Period Difference-in-Differences Designs 2 (2018) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (unpublished working paper) (noting that the “two-way ﬁxed effects estimator itself
does not correspond to any valid matching estimator and can often impute improper counterfactuals for treated units”).
220. See Athey & Imbens, supra note 219, at 62–63; see also A. Craig MacKinlay, Event
Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. Econ. Literature 13, 13 (1997) (explaining that
event studies are widely used in accounting, ﬁnance, and economics research, among other
ﬁelds).
221. For an explanation of the developments regarding event study methodology, see
generally Simon Freyaldenhoven, Chistian Hansen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Pre-Event Trends in
the Panel Event-Study Design, 109 Am. Econ. Rev. 3307 (2019). For the history of event
study designs, see generally John J. Binder, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, 11
Rev. Quantitative Fin. & Acct. 111 (1998).
222. See, e.g., Liyang Sun & Sarah Abraham, Estimating Dynamic Treatment Effects in
Event Studies With Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, 225 J. Econometrics 175, 175–77
(2021). For recent examples of stacked event studies being used in the law and economics
literature, see Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, How Constitutional Rights Matter 106–10,
143, 187–89, 279–82 (2020); Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using
Civilian Allegations to Predict Police Misconduct, 11 Am. Econ. J. 225, 244 (2019) (using
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Employing this method, we deﬁne an event as the adoption of a diversity policy for the selection of editors. Event time is deﬁned as the year
relative to the year that the diversity policy was adopted. For each event,
we match “treated” law reviews that had a change in a diversity policy that
we observe for ten years (ﬁve before and ﬁve after the change in policy)
with a set of “control” law reviews that we observe for the same ten years
(ﬁve before and ﬁve after the change in policy of the treated journal).
For a given event, the control group consists of all journals in our
sample that did not change their diversity policies over the same time period. This means that there can be a different number of control law reviews for each event. For example, consider Virginia Law Review’s ﬁrst
policy, which was adopted in 1987. This event consists of ten years of articles for Virginia (the treatment journal) from 1982 to 1991. This event
uses any journal that did not change its policy from 1982 to 1991 as a control group. Based on the information in Table 1, the control group in this
example therefore includes the law reviews at the University of Chicago,
the University of Michigan, Northwestern University, Stanford University,
the University of Texas at Austin, UCLA, USC, Vanderbilt University,
Washington University in St. Louis, and Yale University. However, because
the law reviews at University of California, Berkeley, Columbia University,
Cornell University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, and the
University of Pennsylvania changed their policies between 1982 and 1991,
the control group in this example does not include these journals. For
each of the control journals for an event, there are ten years of articles.
The California Law Review has altered its diversity policy repeatedly in the
years since 1969, so we never use it as part of the control group in our
event studies.223 There are nineteen journals in our sample due to the fact
that we always exclude Minnesota on account of uncertainty regarding
when its one diversity policy change was made.224 This means that there
are up to 190 journal-years for each event (ten for the treatment journal
and 180 for the control journals).
We make two important sample restrictions. First, to allow articles
time to be cited, we exclude events where the articles in the last year of the
event window have not been published for at least ﬁve years. This means
that we exclude events occurring after 2008. Second, in attempts to isolate
the stacked event study to examine police misconduct); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F.
Wasserman, Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence From Pharmaceutical Patent
Examination 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27579, 2020), https://www.
nber.org/system/ﬁles/working_papers/w27579/w27579.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G33-7H93]
(using a stacked event study for patent examination investigations).
223. See Amy DeVaudreuil, Silence at the California Law Review, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1183,
1191–201 (2003) (reviewing Andrea Guerrero, Silence at Boalt Hall: The Dismantling of
Affirmative Action (2002)). We excluded Berkeley from our initial pre-analysis plan because
of the changing diversity policies and precommitted to this approach. Chilton et al.,
Preregistered Study, supra note 209, at 8–9. However, when we include Berkeley as part of
the control group in our event study analysis, our results are unaffected.
224. See supra note 191.
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only changes attributable to a single change in policy, we restrict to events
where there are no other changes in the law review’s diversity policies
within the event window. Our ﬁnal sample includes eight events (Harvard
1982, Michigan 1983, NYU 1983, Virginia 1987, Columbia 1989, Cornell
1989, Georgetown 2007, UCLA 2007).
We then stack all events around event time and compare the treated
law reviews with the change in a diversity policy to the control law reviews
experiencing no changes in diversity policies in the event window. With
the stacked event study dataset, we estimate the change in citations following the DiD approach in Equation 2
yijet = α + β Treatedjet × Postet + γ Treatedjet +
ζ Postjet + ψt + ηj + φe + δje + εijet

(2)

for article i, law review j, event e, and year t. Treatedjet is an indicator variable for the treatment law review in the event. Postet is an indicator variable
for the years after event time 0. The speciﬁcation includes year ﬁxed effects
ψt, law review ﬁxed effects ηj, and event ﬁxed effects φe (which apply to
both the treatment and control journals in the event). In the preferred
speciﬁcation, we include event-journal ﬁxed effects δje, absorbing both the
event ﬁxed effects and the journal ﬁxed effects. This implies that we draw
on variation within a given journal-event. The coefficient of interest β is
on the interaction between Treatedjet and Postet. It indicates the average
change in citations after the adoption of a diversity policy.
In this stacked event study framework, statistical inference requires
proper clustering of standard errors to account for several dimensions of
correlation in the error terms. First, the stacked nature of the data means
that a given journal-year can be present multiple times in the data. For
example, the University of Chicago Law Review in 1985 serves as a control
observation for Harvard’s 1982 change, Michigan’s 1983 change, NYU’s
1983 change, Penn’s 1984 change, Virginia’s 1987 change, Columbia’s
1989 change, and Cornell’s 1989 change. The fact that a single journalyear observation shows up multiple times as a control group for different
events introduces correlation between the error terms for the repeated
control observations in the data. This can be accommodated by clustering
standard errors by journal. By clustering by journal, our approach additionally accounts for residual within-journal variation that occurs across
events and across time. Second, the journals in any given year can experience a shock common to all the journals, caused by, for instance, many
important Supreme Court cases that give rise to articles or the changing
composition of authors or articles written. To address this, we additionally
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cluster standard errors by year. Finally, there can be correlation within a
given event, in part because we select control journals at the event level.225
To interpret the estimates, it is worth emphasizing two points. First,
the same number of minority students might be selected to join law reviews
irrespective of the law review’s diversity policy. Without information on
whether each member was selected because of the diversity policy, there is
no way to estimate the effect of diversity itself. Because we estimate the
effect of the changes in policies and not the resulting change in the
percent of the members that are on the law review, our estimates should
be interpreted as intent-to-treat estimates.
Second, there are many mechanisms that could cause the adoption of
law review diversity policies to be associated with changes in citations of
the articles they publish, but we cannot distinguish between them. For instance, it could be the case that diverse groups of editors deliberate in a
way that makes it more likely that they compromise and select already
prominent articles, which may lead to higher citations. Alternatively, the
adoption of diversity policies could improve the quality of the editors on
the law review without directly changing the way the editors deliberated.
Additionally, having a diverse group of editors could lead to an improved
deliberative process that resulted in better articles being selected. But even
if the adoption of diversity policies does improve the deliberation process,
this could be due to several speciﬁc mechanisms. Notably, the theoretical
literature on the value of diversity has suggested several distinct mechanisms that could all lead to better decisionmaking when groups are more
diverse. For instance, diverse groups may be better at problem solving, prediction, classiﬁcation, verifying the truth of claims, or idea generations.226
Or another possibility is that the adoption of diversity policy leads to
changes in author behavior where authors of higher quality articles are
more likely to choose to publish with a given law review because of the
diversity policy it has in place. We are unable to delineate between which
of these, or many other, potential mechanisms may lead to a law review
with a diversity policy in place selecting articles that may be more or less
likely to be cited.
D. Descriptive Statistics and Parallel Trends
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the panel dataset and the
stacked event study dataset at the article level. Column 1 reports descriptive statistics of the panel dataset. Columns 2–4 report descriptive statistics
225. To perform the multi-way clustering, we employ the approach described in Sergio
Correia, A Feasible Estimator for Linear Models With Multi-Way Fixed Effects 1–2 (2016),
http://scorreia.com/research/hdfe.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9V-XRJ7] (working paper).
226. See generally Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates
Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies (2007) (discussing how diversity leads to improved group decisions and predictions); see also Scott E. Page, The Diversity Bonus: How
Great Teams Pay Off in the Knowledge Economy 68–132 (2017) (analyzing the contribution
of diversity on various cognitive tasks).
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of the stacked event study dataset. The mean and median citations in the
stacked event study dataset are comparable but higher than in the panel
dataset.
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Stacked Events
Citations

Panel

All

Control

Treatment

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Mean

74

84

82

102

Median

41

46

45

60

Standard Deviation

112

120

119

130

Articles

13468

13067

11938

11129

Journal-Year

1080

1050

970

80

Observations

Figure 2 reports a scatterplot of article-level citations separately by
journal, where the vertical line indicates an extensive margin change in
diversity policy from Table 1. Importantly, Figure 2 reveals that there is a
decline in the number of citations that articles published in later years
have received. This is because recent articles have had less time to receive
citations, which suggests that raw data of citations alone will be insufficient
to reveal whether diversity policies have been associated with increases in
citations.
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FIGURE 2. CITATIONS OF ARTICLES BY JOURNAL
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The key identifying assumption in our approach is that article citations would develop similarly over time in the treated and control law reviews. This “parallel-trends assumption” is the standard assumption for
DiD research designs. We assess this parallel-trends assumption in Figure
3. The ﬁgure reports event studies of mean citations (Panel A) and median
citations (Panel B) in the treatment and control law reviews for each of
the ﬁve years before and after a change in a diversity policy. We average
citations for treatment and control series across all events for each event
time. The panels provide visual evidence for the parallel-time trends assumption for mean citations and median citations.
However, although this visual evidence is consistent with the assumption that article citations would develop similarly over time in the treated
and control law reviews, it is still possible that article citations would have
diverged even if the diversity policies were not adopted when they were.
This could be true if, for instance, the diversity policies were adopted at
the same time that other policy changes were made at the treated law reviews or the law schools that publish them that would have produced the
same results. The estimates should therefore be interpreted as the combined effect of the diversity policy and any other unobserved policy
changes.
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FIGURE 3. CITATIONS AROUND CHANGES IN DIVERSITY POLICIES
1. Mean Citations

2. Median Citations
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IV. RESULTS
We now turn to estimating the relationship between law reviews’ adoption of diversity policies and the impact of the articles those journals publish. We begin by presenting our primary results using the two research
designs described in Part III. We then present several additional analyses
we performed to assess the robustness of our results.
A.

Primary Results

Table 3 reports the results of the two-way ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations
from Equation 1. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates where the policy
takes effect in the year after it was enacted. Columns 3 and 4 report the
cumulative estimates of the distributed lag model. Columns 1 and 3 include year and journal ﬁxed effects. Columns 2 and 4 add journal-speciﬁc
linear time trends.
We begin in Panel A by estimating Equation 1 at the article level.227
Because article citations are skewed to the right, we use the natural log of
article citations as the outcome.228 This roughly allows for an interpretation of the estimates in percent terms (e.g., a coefficient of 0.06 would
suggest that citations are 6% higher in years where a law review has a diversity policy).229 Panel B of Table 3 also estimates Equation 1 at the article
level, but it adds ﬁxed effects for the top ﬁfty most popular article subjects
on HeinOnline.230 Panels C and D of Table 3 report the results where the
observation is at the journal-year level. Panel C reports the results where
the outcome is the mean citation in a journal-year. Panel D reports the
results where the outcome is the median citation in a journal-year.

227. Differences in the number of articles published from year-to-year and journal-tojournal means that we give journals and years with more articles published more weight for
the article level regressions. We nonetheless report the article level regressions as a different
cut at the data and for transparency.
228. To account for articles with zero citations, we add one before taking the log.
229. The coefficient is interpreted in log points but can be converted into a percent
interpretation.
230. These subjects were shown in Figure 1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3856280

382

[Vol. 122:331

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 3. PANEL REGRESSIONS—ESTIMATES OF
DIVERSITY POLICIES ON CITATIONS

No
(1)

Distributed Lag
No
Yes
(2)
(3)

Yes
(4)

A. Article Level: ln(Citations)
Diversity Policy
0.04
(0.10)

0.04
(0.10)

0.04
(0.10)

0.05
(0.10)

N

13468

13468

13468

13468

B. Article Level With Subject Fixed Effects: ln(Citations)
Diversity Policy
0.03
0.04
0.03
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.11)

0.05
(0.10)

N

13468

13468

13468

13468

C. Journal-Year Level: Mean Citations
Diversity Policy
1.6
3.2
(6.0)
(6.7)

1.0
(6.9)

1.9
(6.8)

N
Dep Var Mean

1080
75.0

1080
75.0

1080
75.0

D. Journal-Year Level: Median Citations
Diversity Policy
6.3*
10.7*
(3.6)
(4.7)

6.4
(3.9)

11.3*
(6.2)

N
Dep Var Mean
Covariates
Year Fixed Effects
Journal Fixed Effects
Journal Time Trends

1080
75.0

1080
53.0

1080
53.0

1080
53.0

1080
53.0

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected using multidimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within
law review, and within year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4 reports the results of the stacked event study. Columns 1 and
2 have the treatment apply in the year after the vote, and Columns 3 and
4 have the treatment apply two years after the vote. Columns 1 and 3 include year, journal, event time, and event ﬁxed effects. Columns 2 and 4
add journal-event ﬁxed effects. The four panels in Table 4 follow the same
structure as the panels in Table 3. Because we include journal-event ﬁxed
effects in the event study, we draw on variation within a given journal-event.
In the stacked event study dataset at the journal-event-year level, the overall standard deviation of mean citations is 65, the between journal-event
standard deviation of mean citations is 55, and the within journal-event
standard deviation of mean citations is 34; the overall standard deviation
of median citations is 46, the between journal-event standard deviation of
median citations is 39, and the within journal-event standard deviation of
median citations is 25.231

231. Given that the event window is shifted one year later when the treatment is deﬁned
as taking effect in the two years after a policy was adopted, these numbers will differ slightly
in this data construction.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3856280

384

[Vol. 122:331

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

TABLE 4. STACKED EVENT STUDY—ESTIMATES OF
DIVERSITY POLICIES ON CITATIONS
Treatment at t+1
(1)
(2)

Treatment at t+2
(3)
(4)

A. Article Level: ln(Citations)
Post × Treated
0.19
(0.20)

0.17
(0.22)

0.15
(0.14)

0.14
(0.13)

N

13067

13267

13267

13067

B. Article Level With Subject Fixed Effects: ln(Citations)
Post × Treated
0.18
0.17
0.15
(0.23)
(0.19)
(0.14)

0.14
(0.14)

N

13067

13067

13267

13267

C. Journal-Year Level: Mean Citations
Post × Treated
11.8
11.8
(9.0)
(8.9)

6.7
(5.3)

6.7
(7.0)

N
Dep Var Mean

1050
84.4

1050
83.8

1050
83.8

D. Journal-Year Level: Median Citations
Post × Treated
15.1
15.1
(8.9)
(8.9)

17.2*
(8.3)

17.2*
(8.2)

N
Dep Var Mean
Covariates
Year FE
Journal FE
Event Time FE
Event FE
Journal × Event FE

1050
84.4

1050
60.7

1050
60.7

1050
60.1

1050
60.1

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected using multidimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within
law review, and within year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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The results in Tables 3 and 4 are broadly consistent. The coefficients
are positive for all speciﬁcations reported in Tables 3 and 4. The speciﬁcations using mean citations—reported in Panels A, B, and C—as the dependent variable, however, are imprecisely estimated. It is important to
note that citations are right skewed, which results in measures of mean
citations being largely inﬂuenced by outliers.232 That is, although it is impossible to have fewer than zero citations, a handful of articles can have a
great deal more citations than other articles. As a result, measures of mean
citations have higher variance than measures of median citations.233
For median article citations as the dependent variable, the results are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level in ﬁve of eight speciﬁcations, and the speciﬁcations that are not statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level narrowly miss being signiﬁcant. To put the size of the effects in
context, the estimates from Column 4 in Panel D of Table 3 suggest that
the median citations increased by 21% after the adoption of a diversity
policy (more speciﬁcally, the estimated increase is 11.3 compared to an
average of 53.0 citations), and the estimates from Column 4 in Panel D of
Table 4 suggest that the median citations increased by roughly 29% (more
speciﬁcally, the estimated increase is 17.2 compared to an average of 60.1
citations).234

232. See, e.g., María Victoria Anauati, Sebastian Galiani & Rámiro H. Galvez, Difference
in Citation Patterns Across Journal Tiers: The Case of Economics, 58 Econ. Inquiry 1217,
1221 (2020) (“Differences between mean and median values show that skewness in the distribution of total citation at the article level is noteworthy.”); Hamermesh, supra note 29, at
125 (“A central fact runs through all these comparisons: the distributions of citation
measures are highly right-skewed. For that reason, throughout this section I present data
describing the shapes of the distributions of citations, not merely measures of central tendency, particularly means . . . .”); Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. Legal
Analysis 309, 319 (2013) (“The difference between mean and median is reﬂected by the
high standard deviation . . . , skewed in part by outlier articles with unusually high citations . . . .”).
233. For further exploration of this issue, see infra section IV.B.5.
234. Given the claims made in current lawsuits that increased diversity may actually lead
to worse performance, it is also worth considering whether our results leave open the possibility that the effect may be negative. To assess this claim, we can examine whether the 90%
conﬁdence interval would include any negative effects that could be still considered substantively meaningful. This approach has been most commonly used in political science.
See, e.g., Carlisle Rainey, Arguing for a Negligible Effect, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1083, 1090
(2014). But it is also used in peer-reviewed law and economics journals. See, e.g., Adam
Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Rights Without Resources: The Impact of Constitutional Social
Rights on Social Spending, 60 J.L. & Econ. 713, 734 (2017). To do so, we focus on the lower
bound of the 90% conﬁdence interval in Column 4 of each panel of both Table 3 and Table
4. Panel A of Tables 3 and 4 rule out negative effects of diversity policies on citations at the
article level larger than 11.5% and 7.5%, respectively. Panel B of Tables 3 and 4 rule out
negative effects of diversity policies on mean article citations larger than 11.5% and 9%,
respectively. Panel C of Tables 3 and 4 rule out negative effects of diversity policies on mean
article citations larger than 9.5% and 5%, respectively. Panel D of Tables 3 and 4 rule out
any negative effects of diversity policies on median article citations.
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It is worth emphasizing that a few of these speciﬁcations narrowly miss
being signiﬁcant at a 10% level. This is in part due to the approach we take
to clustering standard errors. Our primary results use three-way clustering
at the journal, year, and event level.235 This is a conservative approach to
clustering standard errors that signiﬁcantly reduces statistical power, which
in turn makes it less likely that we would ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant results.
Importantly, other recent studies that have used DiD research methods
while analyzing treatments with staggered timing have clustered their
standard errors at a single level.236 We thus explore the sensitivity of the
stacked event study estimates to alternative ways of clustering standard errors. Figure 4 reports all of the main results in the stacked event study design described above with different units of clustering (in particular,
separately by journal, year, and event). Figure 4 speciﬁcally plots the point
estimates and 90% and 95% conﬁdence intervals using the speciﬁcations
reported in Table 4. Across the panels and speciﬁcations, the results are
consistent with the results reported in the main analysis, but the standard
errors are usually larger when using multi-way clustering.

235. See supra text accompanying note 225.
236. See, e.g., Andrew Goodman-Bacon, The Long-Run Effects of Childhood Insurance
Coverage: Medicaid Implementation, Adult Health, and Labor Market Outcomes, 111 Am.
Econ. Rev. 2550, 2559–60 (2021); see also Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 222, at 16–20.
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1. Treatment at t+1
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2. Treatment at t+2
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Robustness Checks

We next report ﬁve ways in which we explore the robustness of our
results: (1) assessing changes to article subjects, (2) accounting for homeschool authors, (3) changing the event window, (4) dropping individual
events, and (5) exploring changes in the publication of highly cited
articles.
1. Assessing Changes to Article Subjects. — A change in diversity policy
might lead to a change in the distribution of the subjects of the articles the
journal publishes. For example, a journal that implements a diversity policy might simultaneously begin publishing more articles about race and
gender, either due to a shift in journal priorities or because of the new
editors’ preferences. This increased focus on race and gender might mean
that the journal publishes more articles about constitutional law and fewer
on tax law, for example. But because articles on different subjects have
different citations patterns, one concern is that changes in quality could
be masked by an accompanying change in the distribution of article subjects. For example, the true quality of articles could have decreased, but
the journal might now be publishing more articles in subjects that are
highly cited.
We investigate this concern by assessing whether law reviews published a higher share of articles related to diversity after the adoption of
diversity policies. To do so, we identify ﬁve of the ﬁfty most common subjects from HeinOnline that we believe are most directly related to diversity.
Those ﬁve subjects are: age, civil rights, discrimination, gender, and race
and ethnicity. Figure 5 reports the share of articles related to diversity that
were published by the law reviews in our stacked event study framework.
The results suggest there may be a modest increase in the share of articles
that were published related to diversity in the years after diversity policies
are adopted. The differences are small and not statistically signiﬁcant, but
the data in Figure 5 leaves open the possibility that there is some change
in the subjects of articles published after diversity policies are adopted.
To more formally account for this possibility, Panel B of Tables 3 and
4 include subject ﬁxed effects, which should control for changes in the
subjects of articles. The results when including these ﬁxed effects are similar to the other results in Tables 3 and 4. These results suggest that even
if diversity policies do lead to some change in the distribution of the subjects of the articles the journal publishes, these changes in subjects are not
driving the primary results.
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FIGURE 5. PUBLICATION OF ARTICLES WITH SUBJECTS RELATED TO
DIVERSITY

2. Accounting for Home-School Authors. — Another concern is that law
reviews’ tendency to publish articles written by scholars that teach at their
law school may bias our results. Notably, there is evidence that the articles
that law reviews publish that are written by the schools’ own faculty are
cited less than articles that law reviews publish by outside faculty.237 If law
reviews publish home-school faculty for purposes other than choosing the
best articles, then including articles by home-school faculty in the sample
will affect the estimates. Moreover, if law reviews are more or less likely to
accept articles written by home-school faculty after implementing a diversity policy, then including articles by home-school faculty can bias the results. For instance, if a more diverse group of editors has greater difficulty
reaching consensus on which articles to select for publication, the editors
may be more likely to default to selecting articles written by professors that
teach at their institution.
To assess these concerns, we remove home-school faculty from our
sample and re-estimate our primary speciﬁcations. To do so, we match authors in our sample to the AALS directory. We code articles with multiple
authors as being written by a home-school author if any of the professors
are from the home law school. Table 5 reports the results of the stack event
study analysis after excluding home-school faculty. The results provide no

237. See Yoon, supra note 232, at 310. Professors Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars found
similar evidence. See Ayres & Vars, supra note 28, at 440.
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evidence that including articles written by home-school faculty meaningfully inﬂuences the results.
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TABLE 5. STACKED EVENT STUDY—ESTIMATES OF DIVERSITY POLICIES ON
CITATIONS—AFTER EXCLUDING HOME-SCHOOL AUTHORS
Treatment at t+1
(1)
(2)

Treatment at t+2
(3)
(4)

A. Article Level: ln(Citations)
Post × Treated
0.20
(0.21)

0.18
(0.22)

0.16
(0.17)

0.15
(0.15)

N

11603

11894

11894

B. Article Level With Subject Fixed Effects:
ln(Citations)
Post × Treated
0.20
0.18
(0.23)
(0.24)

0.15
(0.17)

0.14
(0.16)

N

11603

11894

11894

C. Journal-Year Level: Mean Citations
Post × Treated
7.5
7.5
(8.8)
(8.7)

5.4
(6.9)

5.4
(10.3)

N
Dep Var Mean

1050
82.4

1050
81.4

1050
81.4

D. Journal-Year Level: Median Citations
Post × Treated
19.0
19.0*
(10.4)
(9.2)

20.1*
(9.8)

20.1**
(7.8)

N
Dep Var Mean

11603

11603

Covariates
Year FE
Journal FE
Event Time FE
Event FE
Journal × Event FE

1050
82.4

1050
59.0

1050
59.0

1050
58.3

1050
58.3

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected using multidimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within
law review, and within year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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3. Changing the Event Window. — We next investigate the extent that
the results are sensitive to our decision to examine a ﬁve-year window
around changes in diversity policies. To assess this possibility, we vary the
event window before and after changes in diversity policies from three to
seven years. Table 6 reports the results of these regressions using the speciﬁcations reported in Table 4 in Columns 2 and 4 of Panels C and D. As
the results in Table 6 show, although the point estimates and standard errors differ between the event windows, the differences are not substantively meaningful.
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TABLE 6. STACKED EVENT STUDY—ESTIMATES OF DIVERSITY POLICIES ON
CITATIONS—USING ALTERNATIVE EVENT WINDOWS
Event Window
3 years

4 years

5 years

6 years

7 years

A. Mean Citations (Table 4, Column 2)
Post × Treated

Dep Var Mean

23.4

11.5

11.8

15.3

10.2

(12.5)

(10.5)

(8.9)

(8.7)

(10.0)

86.9

85.1

84.8

84.1

83.3

B. Mean Citations (Table 4, Column 4)
Post × Treated

Dep Var Mean

-3.1

4.6

6.7

7.2

11.9

(12.0)

(7.1)

(7.0)

(8.5)

(9.1)

84.6

85.3

83.8

82.7

82.2

C. Median Citations (Table 4, Column 2)
Post × Treated

Dep Var Mean

21.9*

16.7*

15.1

17.0*

16.1

(11.4)

(8.4)

(8.9)

(7.8)

(10.9)

61.7

61.1

60.7

60.8

59.9

D. Median Citations (Table 4, Column 4)
Post × Treated

12.6

15.0

17.2*

16.3

18.6*

(9.9)

(8.8)

(8.2)

(12.8)

(9.8)

Dep Var Mean

60.7

60.5

60.1

59.1

59.1

N

630

840

1050

1260

1470

Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected using multidimensional clustering that allows for correlation within event, within
law review, and within year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3856280

2022]

ASSESSING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

395

4. Dropping Individual Events. — Another concern with our results is
that they could be driven by abnormally large changes in article citations
associated with a single event. This concern is particularly relevant in our
setting because our stacked event study analysis leverages just eight diversity policies as treatment events. To assess this possibility, we conducted a
robustness check where we dropped individual events one at a time from
our sample and re-ran our primary speciﬁcations.238 Figure 6 reports the
results. Panel A reports the results of mean citations from estimating the
speciﬁcation in Column 4, Panel C of Table 4. Panel B reports the results
of median citations from estimating the speciﬁcation in Column 4, Panel
D of Table 4. In both panels, the left-hand estimate shown in bold reports
the coefficient and conﬁdence interval for our initial results that do not
leave out any events. The other estimates then show the coefficient of interest and conﬁdence interval when leaving out one event at a time. In
Panel A, we ﬁnd some evidence that one of the events is increasing the
noise of our estimates. In Panel B, we ﬁnd no evidence that a single event
is driving the results.

238. For an example of the use of this robustness check in a DiD framework, see Michael
Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician
Behavior: Evidence From the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 257
app. C (2013).
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FIGURE 6. ESTIMATES LEAVING ONE EVENT OUT
a. Mean Citations

b. Median Citations
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5. Exploring Changes in the Publication of Highly Cited Articles. — In our
primary results, when assessing the effect of diversity policies on mean citations, the point estimates in Tables 3 and 4 were consistently positive but
not statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, when assessing the effect of diversity policies on median citations, the point estimates were consistently positive and either statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or close to
conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
This raises the question of how a law review that adopts a diversity
policy could improve the median citations of the articles they publish without at the same time increasing the mean citations of the articles they publish. There are at least two possible explanations for this pattern. The ﬁrst
explanation is that the selection of high-impact articles may be somewhat
random. Since mean citations can be skewed by a handful of papers getting a large number of citations, any arbitrariness in the publication of a
highly cited paper would introduce noise in mean citations.
The second explanation is that law reviews that adopt diversity policies
may be less likely to select high-impact articles for publication. This could
be the case, for instance, if diverse boards are more risk averse in their
article selection. To assess this possibility, we test whether the changes in
mean results are driven by law reviews with diversity policies in place
rejecting high-impact articles, alternatively deﬁned as articles at least in
the 90th, 95th, or 99th percentile of citations in a given year. We then reestimated the speciﬁcations from Panels A and B of Tables 3 and 4 while
using these three deﬁnitions of high-impact articles as the dependent
variable. When doing so, we ﬁnd no evidence that law reviews with diversity
policies are less likely to publish high-impact articles than law reviews
without diversity policies in place. This result provides some evidence that
the noisiness in mean estimates may be driven by outliers when a law
review by chance publishes an article that becomes extremely highly cited.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
We found evidence that diversity policies of law reviews increase the
median impact of the articles those law reviews select. With respect to
mean citations, the point estimates are consistently positive, but do not
reach statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels. Given that one of law
reviews’ principal objectives is to publish impactful scholarship, we take
this as evidence that diverse law review boards outperform nondiverse
boards. In this Part, we discuss the possible ramiﬁcations of this study for
larger questions of diversity in higher education. Although student-run law
journals are a particularized context, the work done by student editors is
similar to the academic work that takes place in many other settings, both
inside and outside the classroom, in which diversity is relevant or contested. We thus believe that our ﬁndings hold implications for larger debates on affirmative action.
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First, the article selection process is undertaken by a group of students
working and discussing as a team. It thus mirrors, in many ways, the sorts
of discussions that students might have in the normal course of academic
life: discussions within the classroom on academic topics, group projects
of all types, and even discussions about academic or other issues of importance that take place outside of the classroom. Diversity in higher education has focused on promoting better conversations and collaboration
among students both inside and outside of the classroom. The law review
selection and editing process exempliﬁes the types of collective work at
which diverse groups are thought to excel.239
Our study thus implicates the core rationales the Supreme Court has
relied upon in upholding affirmative action. As Justice Powell wrote in
Bakke, “The atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation—so essential to the quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”240 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor noted
that “student body diversity promotes learning outcomes,” and “classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting when the students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”241 Most recently, Justice Kennedy concluded in Fisher I that “the
attainment of a diverse student body . . . enhance[s] classroom dialogue.”242 Our results lend support to Justice O’Connor’s and Justice
Kennedy’s predictions about the potential gains from promoting diversity.
Second, the law review selection process involves reasoning, deliberation, and analysis similar to that which characterizes higher education
more generally. Imagine, for instance, a group of law review editors discussing whether to accept for publication an article that examines “stopand-frisk” policies and criminal procedure. The students will likely debate
whether the argument is sound on its own terms, whether it adequately
addresses potential counterarguments, and whether it offers novel ideas.
Our study suggests that the law review editors may be more effective at
answering those questions if the group is diverse. For instance, it could be
the case that different members of the group are able to contribute different viewpoints to the collective process. In this example, Black and Latinx
students might be able to supply perspectives or information on “stop-andfrisk” policies that differ from those of their white peers. But the point is
more general and cuts across a wide range of legal subjects. These are precisely the sorts of discussions that students might have in the context of a
239. See Post & Minow Amicus Brief, supra note 179, at 17 (“In our educational judgment, law students who pursue careers both within and outside the legal profession will
inevitably interact with increasingly diverse clients, managers, and colleagues . . . . In our
view, diversity is associated with better educational outcomes.”).
240. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013).
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class on criminal procedure or in the hallways following the class. Of
course, the issue of whether an article makes a novel contribution is not
one that will normally appear in class. But the analytic process of assessing
the relationship between ideas and weighing the importance of one argument against another is a quintessential academic exercise, one which
should be familiar to any law student who has been asked to distinguish
cases or trace a line of precedent.
These points drawn from the law school context extend to many
spheres in higher education. The classroom work of undergraduates studying history, political science, literature, or economics, and the conversations students enrolled in those courses have in their dorm lounges late
into the night, bear a strong resemblance to the conversations of law students in class or law review editors debating which article to select. Indeed,
as much as law professors talk about “learning to think like a lawyer,” the
modes of argument and analysis that operate in law recur in a wide swath
of academic disciplines.
We thus believe that our study is relevant to many of the criticisms
leveled against the diversity rationale, which section I.B details. In the context of student editors accepting law review articles, our results provide
evidence that diversity can provide meaningful beneﬁts for institutions of
higher education, beneﬁts that are tied directly to the academic mission.
And contra Justice Alito, we have proposed one “metric that would allow
a court to determine” whether the diversity rationale is serving its desired
purpose.243 At the same time, our research does not speak to other critiques of the diversity rationale. For instance, Professor Stephen Carter has
noted that the diversity rationale could encourage Black students to embrace a sort of racialized party line, “to articulate the presumed views of
other people who are black—in effect, to think and act and speak in a
particular way, the black way—and [it may suggest] that there is something
peculiar about black people who insist on doing anything else.”244
Professor Delgado’s trenchant criticism that the diversity rationale could
render minority students “as an ornament, a curiosity” for the white majority makes a similar point.245
These are serious concerns, ones that our study cannot address. At
the same time, they are not the concerns that animate the Supreme
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. As we have explained, the relevant question for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause (and Title VI)
is whether diversity does in fact provide meaningful beneﬁts to institutions
of higher education that would justify its status as a compelling governmental interest.246 Our study addresses that issue directly. The criticisms
243. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
244. Stephen L. Carter, Reﬂections of an Affirmative Action Baby 31 (1991).
245. Delgado, supra note 118, at 570 n.46. For an argument contending that the diversity rationale also adversely affects white students, see generally James, supra note 119.
246. See supra Part I.
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raised by Professors Carter and Delgado, by contrast, are more relevant to
the wisdom of pursuing diversity than to the legality of doing so. Educational leaders would do well to heed their words of caution in designing
and implementing diversity initiatives. But those types of design questions
will be irrelevant if the Supreme Court declares affirmative action unlawful. If diversity is to remain an option, assessing its legal foundation thus
remains critical.
Other critics of diversity initiatives have charged that diversity is irrelevant to signiﬁcant segments of higher education. This criticism is wellencapsulated by Chief Justice John Roberts’s question during oral argument in Fisher II: “[W]hat unique perspective does a minority student
bring to a physics class? . . . I’m just wondering what the beneﬁts of diversity are in that situation?”247 Chief Justice Roberts’s critique has some
force—it may well be that the beneﬁts of diversity we have analyzed are of
diminished relevance in a physics class as compared to a criminal procedure class.248 But our study is indicative of a consideration that Chief
Justice Roberts overlooked. Physics majors participate in academic life in
more ways than merely attending physics classes.249 They work for the student newspaper, they take classes outside of their major, and, of course,
they socialize with other students and have wide-ranging conversations covering matters great and small. In the law school context, the student interested in corporate income tax (perhaps the law school version of physics)
might join the law review and ﬁnd herself analyzing the merits of an article
on the Equal Protection Clause or the Clean Air Act’s intersection with
theories of environmental justice. Students—as Walt Whitman would
note—“[are] large, [they] contain multitudes.”250
Finally, we do not contend that diversity is the only rationale that might
lead one to support affirmative action. Nor do we contend that diversity is
necessarily the strongest rationale for affirmative action, as the remediation-style argument might well possess greater power. Nothing in our study
should be read to cast doubt on the idea that affirmative action is justiﬁed
as a means of remedying past and present racial bias. But that is not to say
that our study is irrelevant to the debate among supporters of affirmative
action. Our study reveals that measurable beneﬁts can ﬂow from racial diversity in academic settings.

247. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), 2015 WL
8482483.
248. There are potentially other beneﬁts to diversity, such as the signaling effect of seeing that all academic disciplines are open to all students regardless of race or other characteristics. But the Supreme Court has not acknowledged or relied upon those beneﬁts in
upholding affirmative action. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (noting certain beneﬁts
of diverse classrooms, but not the signaling effect).
249. Or, at least, most of them do. The one of us who was a physics major can testify to
having done things other than study physics on a regular basis.
250. Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in Leaves of Grass (1855).
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CONCLUSION
A decade after Barack Obama’s presidency of the Harvard Law Review
concluded, he reﬂected on the importance of having racial minorities
serve on law reviews:
I think that minority participation in law reviews is critical for
three reasons. First, in a profession such as law that is obsessed
with rankings and hierarchies, participation in a law review provides minority students the additional edge that they may need
for clerkships, positions in the top law ﬁrms, and career advancement. Second, law reviews shape the conversation about those legal issues that matter most in our society, and it is imperative that
minority voices participate in that conversation. Finally, law reviews provide the intensive writing, research, and organizational
experience that will serve any student in becoming a quality
lawyer.251
Obama’s assessment is characteristically thoughtful and thorough. But he
might have also added a fourth reason that racial diversity on law reviews
is worthwhile: Diverse law reviews do better work.
This Article empirically evaluates how the adoption of policies aimed
at increasing the diversity of law review editors inﬂuenced the impact of
articles published. To do so, we collected data on when the ﬂagship law
reviews of the top twenty law schools adopted or changed diversity policies
and on citations to all articles published in those journals between 1960
and 2018. Using a stacked event study research design, we ﬁnd evidence
that law reviews that adopted diversity policies saw an increase in the median citations of the articles they publish of roughly 25%. Assessing mean
citations, the point estimates are consistently positive, though only a few
speciﬁcations are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Our results thus speak to a long-standing constitutional debate over
the diversity rationale for affirmative action. Ever since Justice Powell
adopted diversity as the sole permissible justiﬁcation for affirmative action
in Bakke,252 and through the Supreme Court’s reaffirmations of that rationale in Grutter and Fisher,253 critics from both the right and left have
savaged the diversity rationale as unsupported and unsound. Indeed, the
critics of diversity—Guido Calabresi, Richard Delgado, Lino Graglia,
Sanford Levinson, Melissa Murray, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas,
among many others—themselves form an impressively diverse group.254
The criticism of diversity has even been visited directly upon student-

251.
252.
253.
254.

JBHE, First Black President, supra note 6, at 25.
See supra text accompanying notes 47–66.
See supra text accompanying notes 71–92.
See supra section I.B.
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edited law reviews. Richard Posner has been characteristically blunt, contending that “[t]he Harvard Law Review, with its epicycles of affirmative
action, is on the way to becoming a laughing stock.”255
Such attitudes culminated in lawsuits against the Harvard Law Review
and New York University Law Review.256 And litigation challenging diversity
programs more generally, including against Harvard University and the
University of North Carolina, is now before the Supreme Court.257 In
Grutter, Justice O’Connor suggested that in 2028 affirmative action would
no longer be needed.258 The Court will soon confront anew the question
of whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest, with the legality
of affirmative action in higher education hanging in the balance.
When the Court faces this question, will it be swayed by the antipathy
that has been heaped upon the diversity rationale? Will it content itself
with mere unsubstantiated assertions? Or will it look to empirical evidence? We have found evidence that policies designed to increase the diversity of groups in an academic setting can lead to an improvement in
group performance. If the Supreme Court does indeed consider renouncing the diversity rationale—thereby forcing universities, law schools, and
even student-run law reviews to forego the beneﬁts of diversity—it would
do well to contemplate the evidence of this Article.

255. Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 77 (1995).
256. Fac., Alumni & Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. Harvard L. Rev., No. 18cv-12105 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2018); Fac., Alumni & Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v.
N.Y. Univ. L. Rev., No. 18-cv-9184 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2018).
257. See Liptak & Hartocollis, supra note 18.
258. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR DIVERSITY PLANS
Diversity Plan

Source and Details (if available)

Berkeley 1969 & 1996

Amy Devaudreuil, Silence at the California Law
Review, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1183 (2003).

Harvard 1982

Paras D. Bhayani, Law Review Debates
Affirmative Action Policy, Harv. Crimson (June
5, 2006),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/6/
5/law-review-debates-affirmative-action-policy/
[https://perma.cc/D7K9-8DG6].
Eighteen of the forty-eight spots on the
Harvard Law Review involved, as part of the
selection process, a personal statement that
could include information relevant to
diversity.

Michigan 1983

Ted Lee, Staff Overhauls Review Selection, Res
Gestae (Feb. 16, 1983),
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1422&context=res_gestae
[https://perma.cc/79KJ-ADMF].

NYU 1983

Email and telephone correspondence with
Editors-in-Chief from 1982–1989.
Twelve of the ﬁfty available spots on the NYU
Law Review involved, as part of the selection
process, a personal statement that could
include information relevant to diversity.

Penn 1985 & 1989

Townsend Davis, Letter to the Editor, Columbia
Law Review Broadens Its Outlook, N.Y. Times,
May 4, 1989, at A34; email and phone
correspondence with editors from 1982–2003.

Penn 1994

Lisa Anderson, Law Review Masks Diversity in
a New Admission System, N.Y. Times, July 7,
1995, at A17; email correspondence with
Editors-in-Chief and Executive Editors from
1982–2003.

Minnesota 1987

Email correspondence with Editors-in-Chief
from 1979–1989 and relevant faculty advisors.
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William Raspberry, Opinion, Affirmative
Action That Hurts Blacks, Wash. Post (Feb. 23,
1987),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opi
nions/1987/02/23/affirmative-action-thathurts-blacks/c933a68f-a9f7-4df8-b7e4a97dcffaa214/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
Ten of the sixty available spots on the Virginia
Law Review involved, as part of the selection
process, a personal statement that could
include information relevant to diversity.

Columbia 1989

Stephen Labaton, Law Review at Columbia in
a Dispute on Bias Plan, N.Y. Times, May 3,
1989, at B1.
Thirty of the forty-ﬁve available spots on the
Columbia Law Review involved, as part of the
selection process, a personal statement that
could include information relevant to
diversity.

Cornell 1989

Cornell Law Review By–Laws, Cornell Univ.
(June 5, 2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/2008060505200
4/http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research
/cornell-law-review/bylaws.cfm (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review).

Georgetown 1991

Marshall Ingwerson, In Pursuit of Racial
Diversity, Christian Sci. Monitor (May 8, 1991)
https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/0508/0808
1.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).

Georgetown 1994

Email correspondence with editors of the
Georgetown Law Journal from 1993–2005.

Georgetown 2007

Email correspondence with faculty and
administrators at Georgetown.

UCLA 2007

Law Review and Diversity, Who Owns the Fox?
(Mar. 14, 2008),
http://uclaw.blogspot.com/2008/03/lawreview-and-diversity.html
[https://perma.cc/G32A-YPGP].

Yale 2012

Email correspondence with the Editor-in-Chief
from 2011–2012.
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Email correspondence with editors.
Ninety percent of the available spots on the
Northwestern Law Review involved, as part of the
selection process, a personal statement that
could include information relevant to
diversity.

Chicago 2017

Elie Mystal & Joe Patrice, Campus Strife Over
Law Review Diversity, Above L. (May 22, 2014),
https://abovethelaw.com/2014/05/campusstrife-over-law-review-diversity/
[https://perma.cc/K335-J6LP]; personal
knowledge of authors.

Duke 2017

Email correspondence with the faculty advisor
to the Duke Law Journal.

Stanford 2017

Email correspondence with the President of
the Stanford Law Review from 2018–2019.

WashU 2020

Personal knowledge of authors.

Texas (Never)

Email correspondence with Editors-in-Chief.

USC (Never)

Email correspondence with Editors-in-Chief.

Vanderbilt (Never)

Email correspondence with Editors-in-Chief.
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